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UNION CHECKOFF ARRANGEMENTS UNDER THE
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I. INTRODUCTION, BACKGROUND, AND OVERVIEW
The object of union security provisions in labor contracts is to guarantee,
at a minimum, each employee's financial support of the union. One method
of implementing this support is to have the employer deduct dues and fees
from the employee's wages and remit them to the union. Thus, in industrial
relations, the "[c]heckoff is a means by which employees voluntarily assign
a portion of their wages to a union in order to pay their dues and other
obligations to the union."'
Although the concept appears to be relatively simple, checkoff arrange-
ments have presented a number of quite complex legal issues to the National
Labor Relations Board (the "Board") and the courts. This Article examines
how those issues have been resolved under the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended ("NLRA" or "Act"), 2 and the Labor Management Rela-
tions (Taft Hartley) Act.3 Issues concerning checkoff arrangements can arise
under three different statutory sections. Section 302 of the Taft-Hartley Act,
discussed in Part II, prohibits checkoff arrangements unless they meet certain
requirements, and provides for civil and criminal sanctions against those
that do not. Second, although section 8 of the NLRA does not mention
checkoffs expressly, its unfair labor practice provisions impact on these
arrangements in a number of ways, as discussed in detail in Part III. Third,
the Article discusses in Part IV, whether the Board, in resolving the statutory
issues, should defer to an arbitral resolution of related contract issues. Lastly,
section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act authorizes the states to prohibit com-
pulsory union membership within their borders, raising an issue of whether
the states may also regulate checkoff arrangements, as discussed in Part V.
* David W. Robinson Chair Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of
Law; B.A., 1964, University of Texas; LL.B., 1967, University of Texas School of Law.
In revised form, this Article will appear in the second edition of T. HAGGARD, COMPULSORY
UNO NIsM, THE NLRB, AND THE COURTS, to be published by the Industrial Research Unit,
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, in 1991.
1. Frito-Lay, Inc., 243 N.L.R.B. 137, 137 (1979). See also The Check-Off in Collective
Agreements, 30 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 1 (1930) ("the checkoff is an arrangement under which
the employer agrees to deduct from the wages due each union employee who signs a written
authorization, the amounts that may be due from month to month from such employee to the
union for regular dues, special assessments or fees," and employer pays over to union the
aggregate amount collected from employees).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1982).
3. 63 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1982).
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A. Checkoff Arrangements and Union Security
"Union security," or "compulsory unionism," refers to a situation where,
by virtue of a contract between an employer and a union, employees are
required to be "members" of the union as a condition of continued em-
ployment.4 Under the Act, however, the most stringent form of membership
which may be required is the payment of a service fee equal to dues and
initiation fees.' It does not encompass an actual or formal affiliation with
4. T. HAGGARD, COMPULSORY UNIONISM, THE NLRB, AND THE COURTS 4 (1977) (discussion
of the four types of union security provisions). Under federal law, the term "membership"
merely connotes the payment of each employee's pro rata share of the cost of union represen-
tation. Communications Workers v. Beck, 108 S. Ct. 2641, 2648 (1988), infra notes 5-6 and
accompanying text. A "closed shop" is one in which a prospective employee must become an
actual member of the union before being hired. A "union" shop is one in which the employee
must join the union within a certain time after being hired. An "agency shop" is one in which
employees are not required to actually belong to the union as members, but must nonetheless
pay the equivalent of dues and fees. Fourth is the "maintenance of membership" provision,
which "imposes no obligation to join a union but merely an obligation to remain a member
once having voluntarily become one." R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 642 (1976);
see also id. at 639-46 (discussing and comparing these types of union security devices). The
National Labor Relations Act originally permitted employers and unions to negotiate closed
shop provisions. Id. at 640. The Taft-Hartley Act added two provisos to the section which
became section 8(a)(3). 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)(3) (1982). The first prevents employer discrimination
on the basis of nonmembership, except where the union does not make membership available
to all employees on equal terms. The second proviso allows the employer to discriminate on
the basis of membership only to the extent that the employee failed to pay the union dues and
initiation fees. Section 8(a)(3) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization: Provided, That nothing in this subchapter, or in any other statute of
the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a
labor organization ... to require as a condition of employment membership therein
on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment or the
effective day of such agreement, whichever is later, . . . Provided further, That no
employer shall justify any discrimination against an employee for nonmembership
in a labor organization ... (B) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that
membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure of the
employee to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as
a condition of acquiring or retaining membership ....
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982) (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court has construed the
"membership" required under section 8(a)(3) to be limited to the obligations imposed by an
agency shop provision. See infra note 5 and accompanying text. For a detailed discussion of
the history of union security provisions under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188
(1982) [hereinafter RLA], see International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
5. Communications Workers v. Beck, 108 S. Ct. 2641, 2648 (1988) ("the 'membership'
that may be ... required has been 'whittled down to its financial core."' (quoting NLRB v.
General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1966))); Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Schermerhorn,
373 U.S. 746, 753 (1963) (nonmembers required to pay "service fee [which] is admittedly the
exact equal of membership initiation fees and monthly dues").
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the union, in the sense of joining it as a private association. Furthermore,
even the financial aspects of the obligation are limited to covering costs
incurred by the union in the discharge of its statutorily-imposed duties as
exclusive representative of employees for collective bargaining purposes. 6
Checkoff arrangements fit easily within the union security concept. Both
compulsory "membership" and checkoff arrangements serve exactly the same
purpose, that of providing the union with the security of knowing that the
"members" it represents will continue to provide the necessary monetary
support for a fixed period.7 One difference between the checkoff and agency-
fee arrangements, the most stringent form of union security agreement
allowed by federal law, 'is that under the latter the employee has no option
but to support the union financially, while the checkoff is an arrangement
which the employee can initially enter into only voluntarily. However, the
"maintenance-of-membership" form of union security, where an employee
who is or becomes a "member" is required to remain one,' also involves an
initial voluntary choice by the employee. There is thus no real difference
between the checkoff and the more traditional forms of union security.
When Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, it likewise recognized
that the checkoff "is a form of 'union security' that is in effect in many
plants." 9 Commentators evaluating the changes which the Taft-Hartley Act
6. Communications Workers, 108 S. Ct. at 2648 (stating that the compulsory union
membership that is allowed by the statute does not include an "obligation to support union
activities beyond those germane to collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance
adjustment").
7. See, e.g., ITT Henze Valve Service, Controls and Instruments Div., 166 N.L.R.B. 592,
597 (1967) (noting that one of the objectives of a checkoff arrangement is "that of achieving
a degree of stability of membership in the plant"); Note, Employer's Liability Under Checkoff
Contract For Non-Union Employee's Dues, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 143, 145 (1947) ("where judicial
resistance to the closed shop itself is strong, unions have written in checkoff provisions, thus
securing at least universal financial support"); Note, Checkoff Of Union Dues Under the
NLRA-A Federally Protected Bargaining Issue, 26 IND. L.J. 443, 447 (1951) ("The principal
merit to a check-off plan arises from the stability of finance and membership which it affords
to the union.").
8. See generally T. HAGGARD, supra note 4, at 4. Under a maintenance-of-membership
arrangement, the employee is locked-in for the duration of the collective bargaining agreement,
usually three years. Under a checkoff arrangement that period is limited to a year. Another
difference relates to the method of "enforcement." The traditional forms of union security are
"enforced" by terminating the employee who refuses to maintain the required membership (e.g.
pay dues), while the checkoff is "enforced" by simply deducting the money from the employee's
paycheck. In both situations, however, union membership is literally made a "condition" of
continued employment.
9. HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947,
H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 29, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 292, 320 (1959) [hereinafter LEGIS. HIST.]. This statement
was made in reference to the original House version of the Taft-Hartley Act which dealt with
checkoffs in the unfair labor practice section of the statute and which permitted them only if
the employee's authorization was revocable upon 30-days notice. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 8(a)(2), at 20-21, reprinted in LEms. HIST., supra, at 177-78.
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made in the NLRA have also recognized the obvious fact that the checkoff
is directly related to union security provisions in labor agreements.' 0
Nevertheless, the prevailing view is that "[tihe checkoff provision is not
a union security device; it is simply an administrative convenience for the
collection of dues."" This mistaken view of the concepts underlying checkoff
arrangements as well as of their character involves more than a mere semantic
quibble. To the contrary, it has tended to prevent the Board and the courts
from creating a coherent body of law on t- checkoff that draws its essence
from the statutory provisions and policies generally limiting compulsory
union membership. Until the close relationship between checkoff arrange-
ments and the more traditional forms of union security is recognized, there
is a serious danger that the law in the former area will operate to frustrate
the purposes of the law in the latter.
B. Nature of the Legal Relationship
The Board has characterized the checkoff in conflicting ways, sometimes
in the same breath. In one case, for example, it said that "a dues-checkoff
authorization, or wage assignment as it is called in this case, is a contract
between an employee and his employer.' ' 2 There is, of course, a radical
difference between a "wage assignment" and a "contract."' 3
The current emphasis is on the checkoff's allegedly contractual nature.
4
This is a questionable way in which to characterize the legal relationship
10. McNatt, Check-Off, 4 LAB. L.J. 123, 123 (1953) ("[t]he check-off is simply another
form of union security provision and is therefore closely related to various union shop provisions
in collective bargaining contracts").
11. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 822, 584 F.2d 41, 43
(4th Cir. 1978). See also NLRB v. Atlanta Printing Specialties & Paper Prods. Union 527, 523
F.2d 783, 786 (5th Cir. 1975) (checkoff is not a union security device because an employee
could revoke authorization and yet continue to pay dues personally).
12. Local Lodge 2045, IAM (Eagle Signal Indus. Controls), 268 N.L.R.B. 635, 637 (1984)
(emphasis added).
13. See E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 776 (1982) ("It is important to remember that an
assignment is a transfer, not a contract (promise), and to understand that whether a transferee
has given value is not the same question as whether a promisee has given consideration.").
14. It is not clear where this notion came from. The Fifth Circuit first gave it that
characterization in 1975, without explanation. See NLRB v. Atlanta Printing Specialties Union,
Local 527, 523 F.2d 783, 785 (5th Cir. 1975). The Board later reached the same conclusion,
and purported to base this on the literal wording of section 302(c)(4) of the Labor Management
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(4) (1982). See Cameron Iron Works, Inc., 235 N.L.R.B. 287,
289 (1978) (union and employer could not change terms of checkoff authorization, as a contract
between employer and employee, by their subsequent agreement without obtaining employee's
signature on new authorization), enforcement denied, 591 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1979). However,
that section nowhere refers to the checkoff as a "contract." Indeed, the statute expressly uses
the word "assignment." In San Diego County District Council of Carpenters (Campbell Indus.),
243 N.L.R.B. 147, 149 (1979), the Board ruled that continued deduction of dues for those who
had resigned their union membership violated section 8(b)(l)(A) of the Act because resignation
revoked checkoff authorization by operation of law. The Board apparently relied on the wording
19901
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that a checkoff authorization establishes between an employer and an em-
ployee. The typical authorization card contains no words of promise by
either party. 5 The employer, who does not even sign the document, certainly
does not expressly promise to do anything.' 6 Even from the employee's
perspective, a signed checkoff authorization is not merely promissory. Rather,
it is an executed transaction consisting of the actual transfer to the union
of the employee's right to receive wage money from the employer. One
might argue that authorization language purporting to make the checkoff
irrevocable is an implied promise by the employee not to revoke the au-
thorization. If so, it still must be supported by consideration before it can
form the basis of a contract.
The purported consideration, however, that is often cited in support of
this alleged contract does not withstand close scrutiny. In the first place, the
"benefits of union membership," however they are defined, clearly do not
flow from the employer, as one court seemed to assume.' 7 On the other
hand, while the consideration that supports a promise may flow from
someone other than the promisee, a union gives no additional benefits in
exchange for a checkoff authorization. The benefit of representation flows
directly from the provisions of the Act.' Furthermore, the additional benefits
of the checkoff authorization itself, which was given "in consideration of the benefits received
and to be received by me as a result of my membership in the Union." Because "consideration"
is a contract concept, the Board apparently concluded that the authorization must necessarily
be a contract. Id. at 149 n.9 ("parties agreed to checkoff on express understanding that union
membership with its attendant benefits furnished consideration therefore").
15. Although the wording varies, the operative legal words in most checkoff authorizations
are "authorize" and "assign." See, e.g., Industrial Towel & Uniform Serv., 195 N.L.R.B.
1121, 1125 (1972) (reproducing "Check-off Authorization and Assignment" form), enforcement
denied, 473 F.2d 1258 (6th Cir. 1973).
16. Whatever contractual duty the employer has to checkoff and transmit dues to the union
arises out the collective bargaining agreement between the employer and the union, not the
checkoff authorization. For a typical collective bargaining agreement checkoff provision, see
Industrial Towel, 195 N.L.R.B. at 1124. Alternatively, the employer's duty to transmit the
money derives from the contract of employment with the employee, who has transferred to the
union the right to receive a portion of the wages that are due. That, however, does not turn
the checkoff authorization itself into a contract.
17. NLRB v. United States Postal Serv., 827 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that since
the employer did not stop providing the benefits of union membership, the employee could not
unilaterally terminate the contract). The court stated, "[allthough the [checkoff authorization]
contract did not explicitly state that the employee's authorization was conditioned on the
employer's performance or tendering of performance, such 'constructive conditions of exchange'
are freely implied." Id. at 554 (emphasis added) (citing E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 579-80
(1982)).
18. The union's statutory duty to represent everyone in the bargaining unit, regardless of
union membership, is known as the "duty of fair representation." Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171
(1967). A union's failure to represent an employee who refused to sign a checkoff authorization
would undoubtedly constitute a breach of that duty of fair representation. In addition, since
the law requires that a checkoff be entirely voluntary, it would also be an unfair labor practice
for the union to even attempt to induce employees into signing a checkoff authorization by
[Vol. 39:567
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of formal membership flow from the membership contract between the
individual and the union,' 9 not from the fact that the employee has executed
a partial wage assignment. Finally, while one might argue that the employee's
implied promise not to revoke creates a unilateral contract that is accepted
by the employer's beginning of performance (forwarding the money to the
union, which also provides the consideration), this is stretching unilateral
contract theory fairly thin.
20
Moreover, these doctrinal contortions are unnecessary because the alter-
native of characterizing the authorization as an assignment is so apt. A
checkoff authorization is exactly what it purports to be-a partial assignment
of the employee's contractual right to receive wages for work done. 2' The
House minority report on the Taft-Hartley Act states that "[tihe check-off
is in the nature of a legal assignment of wages to a creditor. ' 22 It is a present
transfer of a future right under an existing contract. 23 Like any other
assignment, it may be subject to both express and implied conditions. 24
providing them with additional benefits. Cf. Building Material & Dump Truck Drivers, Local
420 (Gregg Indus.), 274 N.L.R.B. 603 (1985) (holding that a union illegally restrains and coerces
employees when it uses economic inducements as a means of obtaining employee signatures on
cards authorizing union as exclusive bargaining representative). In sum, the law virtually
precludes the existence of any union-based additional consideration that could be given in
exchange for a checkoff.
19. Union membership is generally conceptualized in terms of a contract. See, e.g., Inter-
national Ass'n. of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 618 (1958) ("[The] contractual
conception of the relation between a member and his union widely prevails in this country.").
20. See generally J. MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS 69-76 (1974) (implicitly demonstrating
the total inapplicability of this theory to the checkoff author;-ation situation).
21. Gasaway v. Borderland Coal Corp., 278 F. 56, 65 (7th Cir. 1921) (stating that "the
check-off is the voluntary assignment by the employee of so much of his wages as may be
necessary to meet his union dues"). The contract of employment obligates the employer
("obligor") to pay the employee ("obligee") wages for work done, creating in the employee a
right to these wages. "An obligee's transfer of a contract right is known as an assignment of
the right. By an assignment, the obligee as assignor (B) transfers to an assignee (C) a right that
the assignor (B) has against an obligor." E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 746 (1982) (emphasis in
original). See also In re Westmoreland Metal Mfg. Co., 69 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2536 (E.D. Pa.
1968) (court held that dues which the employer withheld but failed to remit to the union were
wages and thus entitled to a priority in bankruptcy proceedings, noting that the checkoff "was
a voluntary arrangement in the nature of an assignment").
22. HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947,
H.R. REP. No. 245 (Minority Report), 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 78, reprinted in LEGis. HIST.,
supra note 9, at 292, 369.
23. 4 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 874, at 505-06 (1951):
It has long been established, also, that an employee has power to assign his right
to future wages, to become due only after performance of services not yet rendered;
and this is true even though there is no enforceable contract binding him to render
the service or binding the employer to keep him employed. It is sufficient that at
the date of the assignment there is an existing employment, an existing relation of
master and servant, under which the wages assigned may reasonably be expected
to be earned.
Id. (footnote omitted).
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 331 (1981) ("An assignment may be conditional,
revocable, or voidable by the assignor, or unenforceable by virtue of a Statute of Frauds.").
1990]
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Furthermore, it may be revocable, or not, depending on whether it is
gratuitous or for value."
To the extent that common law principles are relevant, it would appear
that the Board and the courts should look to the law of contract assignments
rather than the law of contract formation in dealing with checkoff author-
izations. 26 At best, however, this would only provide the correct conceptual
framework within which to begin the analysis. Regardless of what the
common law might dictate, in resolving checkoff issues under the NLRA
and the Taft-Hartley Act, the Board and the courts must rely primarily on
other considerations-the broader policies of federal labor law, the specific
statutory provisions, and the decisional law dealing with union security,
which is the legal context within which this particular form of wage assign-
ment operates.
C. The Relative Importance of the Checkoff to Unions and Employers
As is true of any organization, money is the life blood of a labor union.
Apart from return on investments, this money comes from the dues and fees
of members and employees that the union otherwise represents. Collecting
these monies from each individual is a difficult task, even when payment is
a condition of employment. 27 Certainly, threat of discharge provides a strong
25. An assignment is generally revocable unless it is "for value"-i.e., given: (a) in exchange
for something that would be consideration for a promise, or (b) in satisfaction of a pre-existing
. debt or obligation. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 332(5) (1981); U.C.C. § 1-201(44)
(1987) (definition of value). Although the "exchange" element is lacking with respect to a
checkoff authorization, it could be considered "in satisfaction" of the employee's contractual
obligation of membership. Moreover, the checkoff might be considered irrevocable because it
is a "signed writing." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 332(l)(a) (1981) (in general, a
gratuitous assignment is irrevocable if it is in a writing or under seal and delivered by the
assignor).
26. The principal benefit of this change would be to free the Board from the "failure-of-
consideration" morass that it has gotten into in dealing with the effect of a resignation from
the union upon an employee's right to revoke the checkoff authorization. See infra notes 227-
68 and accompanying text. If this issue were determined according to the law of assignment,
it would become simply whether continued union membership was intended to be a condition
of the ongoing authorization-assuming, of course, that the authorization was not revocable
for some other reason.
27. 93 CONG. REC. 4777, 4806 (May 7, 1947) (remarks of Senator Pepper), reprinted in
LEGIS. HIST., supra note 9, at 1307:
As a matter of sheer efficiency in a plant, the check-off principle is desirable. If
union dues cannot be collected through the check-off principle, it means that the
union must pay someone to go around and see the individual members and collect
their dues. Perhaps the collectors will trespass upon the property of the employer
or take part of the working time of the worker in an effort to collect the dues
when the collector can find the members together. If it is not done at the place of
employment the collector must tramp around from home to home to find the
worker, who may be inclined toward recalcitrance or tardiness, and offer him an
opportunity to pay his union dues.
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incentive, but the actual enforcement of the sanction involves inconvenience
and some risk of liability if the union's attempted enforcement is unwar-
ranted.
These problems, however, are obviated with a checkoff arrangement. The
employer simply deducts the money from the paycheck of each employee
and sends the union a lump sum payment each month. Indeed, the checkoff
is more than a convenience to some unions. A weak union representing a
newly certified bargaining unit may find the checkoff essential to its sur-
vival. 2 s
On the other hand, the checkoff usually involves no more than minor
administrative cost and inconvenience to the employer, 29 and may even be
preferable to allowing union agents to collect dues on company property,
which is a common alternative.30 There are no other tangible business or
management interests at stake, and employer opposition to the checkoff on
noneconomic grounds raises the specter of possible bad-faith bargaining."
In sum, unions have a strong incentive to demand a checkoff arrangement
and employers generally have little incentive to resist that demand too
vigorously. It is not surprising, therefore, that the checkoff is included in
ninety-six percent of all collective bargaining agreements in manufacturing
industries .2
II. SECTION 302 REQUIREMENTS
The primary statutory provision applicable to the checkoff is section 302
of the Taft-Hartley Act, subsection (a), which broadly prohibits employers
28. This was arguably the case in United Steelworkers v. NLRB (H.K. Porter, Co.), 363
F.2d 272 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 851 (1966), which involved a newly certified
union in Danville, Virginia. The court noted that:
The union maintains no office in Danville, that area being serviced from Roanoke,
Virginia, a distance of about 85 miles. Moreover, the 300 company employees live
within a radius of from 35 to 40 miles from Danville. Thus without a check-off,
or some adequate substitute therefor, the collection of dues would have presented
the union with a substantial problem of communication and transportation.
Id. at 274. See infra notes 141-49, and 178-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
H.K. Porter Co. litigation.
29. Even in the "green eye-shade" era of payroll operations, few employers who agreed to
the checkoff tried to require unions to cover the cost of making the deduction, thus suggesting
that it was probably insignificant. Theodore, Checkoff Provisions in Major Union Contracts,
1958-59, 83 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 26, 31 (1960). Under computerized payroll operations, which
can be programmed to handle any number of mandatory and elective withholdings, the addition
of a union dues checkoff would pose even fewer problems. See, e.g., Cone Mills Corp., 169
N.L.R.B. 449, 457 (1968) ("When the Union offered to pay the cost of the checkoff, Cone
refused stating that the cost thereof would be negligible as the payroll was handled on an IBM
machine"), order enforced in part and denied in part, 413 F.2d 445 (4th Cir. 1969).
30. See supra note 27-28.
31. See infra Part III-B, discussing the application of the statutory duty to bargain collec-
tively in good faith to the checkoff.
32. BNA, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS 87:2 (1989). See also
Theodore, supra note 29, at 26 (checkoff arrangement eliminates need to solicit individual
members each month to ensure the union's financial stability).
1990]
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from making payments of money or other things of value to labor unions
and their representatives. 3 Subsection (c) then enumerates several exceptions,
one of which is as follows:
The provisions of this section shall not be applicable ... (4) with respect
to money deducted from the wages of employees in payment of membership
dues in a labor organization: Provided, That the employer has received
from each employee, on whose account such deductions are made, a
written assignment which shall not be irrevocable for a period of more
than one year, or beyond the termination date of the applicable collective
agreement, whichever occurs sooner; .... 34
Remedies for illegal payments include injunctions and other appropriate
relief, even if the parties did not intend to violate the law. 5 Subsection (d),
however, also provides for criminal penalties for willful violations of the
section.3 6 Because of this potential for criminal liability, the courts have
tended to construe the checkoff exception of subsection (c) rather broadly.37
The basic purpose of section 302, which was "to protect employers from
33. 29 U.S.C. § 186(a) (1982).
34. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (1982).
35. Jackson Purchase Rural Elec. Coop. Assoc. v. Local Union 816, IBEW, 646 F.2d 264,
266 & n.1 (6th Cir. 1981) (because section 302(a)(1) provides that it "shall be unlawful" to
check off unior dues without written authorization of employee, Congress did not intend that
only willful violations were to be illegal (citing International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Seatrain
Lines, Inc., 326 F.2d 916, 919 (2d Cir. 1964), and Employees' Independent Union v. Wyman-
Gordon Co., 314 F. Supp. 458, 460 (N.D. II1. 1970))).
36. 29 U.S.C. § 186(d) (1982).
37. NLRB v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 307 F.2d 3, 11-12 (3d Cir. 1962) (broad construction
of section 302 adopted by Department of Justice); see also Justice Department's Opinion on
Checkoff, 22 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 46, 47 (1948) [hereinafter DOJ Opinion] (memorandum to
Solicitor of Department of Labor, May 13, 1948, permits employer with a valid union security
contract to deduct assessments, provided employee has voluntarily signed required authoriza-
tion). At issue in Food Fair Stores were unfair labor practice charges against the employer
under section 8(a)(3) and the union under section 8(b)(2) arising from the employer's deduction,
upon request of the union backed by threat of arbitration, of a strike assessment. 307 F.2d at
4. The court's citation to and discussion of the Department of Justice's construction of section
302 was in response to the union's argument that because the term "periodic dues" in the
unfair labor practice provisions of section 8 had been interpreted so as to exclude assessments
such as the one at issue, the term "membership dues" in section 302 must be construed in the
same way. Id. at 11-12. The narrower ambit of the terms of section 8, the court explained,
was a result of the Board's "policy of protecting the employee from discharge, except for
failure to pay 'periodic dues and initiation fees', strictly interpreting those terms as they appeared
in sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2)." Id. at 16 (emphasis added). Thus, the court held that "periodic
dues" in section 8 did not include the strike assessment and enforced the Board's order against
the charged unfair labor practices. Id. at 16, 21. Interestingly, the court modified the Board's
order so as to require restitution of the assessment only to those employees who had not signed
checkoff authorizations for "membership dues, initiation fees and assessments." Id. at 20. See
infra notes 94-96 and accompanying text for a discussion of the relationship between section
302 and section 8(a)(3).
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extortion and to insure honest, uninfluenced representation of employees," 3
has also caused the courts to take a tolerant view of checkoff arrangements
that run no risk of frustrating that purpose.
A. What May Be Checked-Off
Although the section 302(c)(4) exception speaks only in terms of "mem-
bership dues," the courts have allowed the checkoff of strike assessments,
39
supplemental dues, 40 "emergency dues," '4' percentage levies, 42 a performance
tax,43 and agency shop fees. 4 This broad interpretation flows from an early
38. United Steelworkers v. United States Gypsum Co., 492 F.2d 713, 734 (5th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 998 (1974). See also Schwartz v. Associated Musicians, Local 802, 340
F.2d 228, 233-34 (2d Cir. 1964). The Schwartz court stated:
Congress intended by enacting [section 302) to: (I) protect welfare funds for the
benefit of employees; (2) prevent corruption in the collective bargaining process
through bribery of employee representatives by employers and extortion by employee
representatives; (3) protect against the possible abuse by union officers of the power
they might wield if welfare funds were left to their sole control.
Id.
39. International Union of Mine Workers, Local 515 v. American Zinc, Lead & Smelting
Co., 311 F.2d 656, 659 (9th Cir. 1963) (assessment to assist separate local union in its planned
strike against the employer of its members is lawful if made pursuant to written authorization
from employees).
40. Associated Builders & Contractors v. Carpenters Vacation & Holiday Trust Fund, 700
F.2d 1269, 1277-78 (9th Cir. 1983) (payment of supplemental dues and contributions to fringe
benefit trust fund complied with section 302(c)(4) in part because of the "transitory nature of
employment in the construction industry"), cert. denied, 464 U.S.-825 (1983).
41. Cole v. Local 509, UAW, 68 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2097, 2102 (C.D. Cal. 1968) (emergency
increase in regular periodic dues voted at special convention of local unions was lawful under
section 101(a)(3) of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C.
§ 5411(a)(3) (1988), and employers' checkoff of such dues did not violate section 302(a)(1)).
42. Denov v. Davis, 61 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2203, 2206 (1966) (collection of two percent "work
dues" from band leaders was lawful under section 302 as payment required from leaders in
their capacity as union members and was not payment made by an employer (citing Zentner v.
American Fed. of Musicians, 237 F. Supp. 457 (S.D.N.Y. 1965))).
43. Schwartz v. Associated Musicians, Local 802, 340 F.2d 228, 234 (2d Cir. 1964) (payment
of percentage levy, which was contingent upon employment and applied equally to all members
who secured employment so as to qualify as "membership dues," was made pursuant to proper
authorizations and was therefore lawful under section 302); Carroll v. American Fed'n of
Musicians, 295 F.2d 484, 487 (2d Cir. 1961) (payment by band leaders of 1 percent "tax" and
10 percent "traveling surcharge" for engagements played outside of the jurisdiction of the local
were not made pursuant to written authorization and district court should have granted
injunction against them); Associated Orchestra Leaders v. Philadelphia Musical Society, Local
77, 203 F. Supp. 755, 759 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (applying Carroll, the court denied union's motion
to dismiss because it had not shown that payment of 1 percent "engagement" and 10 percent
"traveling" taxes were made pursuant to written authorizations even if they were "dues" within
the meaning of section 302).
44. Grajczyk v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 210 F. Supp. 702, 704-05 (S.D. Cal. 1962) ("there
can be no logical or practical reason why the exemption of 'membership dues' [in section
302(c)(4)] should not be interpreted to include 'service fees,"' the monies paid in lieu of dues
by nonmembers to the union under an agency shop provision in the collective bargaining
agreement).
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Justice Department memorandum of opinion on the terms of section 302(c)(4)
which stated that "initiation fees and assessments, being incidents of mem-
bership, should be considered as falling within the classification of 'mem-
bership dues."' 45 Thus, what may voluntarily be checked off under the
section 302(c)(4) exception is considerably broader than what may be made
a condition of employment under the proviso to section 8(a)(3) of the Act,
which is limited to "periodic dues and . . . initiation fees."6
While this broad reading of section 302(c)(4) allows for a wide variety of
payments to the union, it also means that if a payment falls within the
definition of "membership dues," the payment is illegal unless the require-
ments of the section are satisfied. That is, section 302(c)(4) has been read
"as providing the exclusive method by which employers may contribute to
the general purpose funds of unions. ' 47 For example, where money was
intended to compensate the union for the loss of dues revenue caused by
job losses from technological change, the court characterized it as "payments
in lieu of check-off" and therefore illegal because the requirement of a
written authorization in section 302(c)(4) was not met. 48
B. Limits on the Right to Revoke
1. Renewal of Authorization
The section 302(c)(4) exemption allowing the checkoff of union dues
applies only if the employer has received a written assignment from each
employee "which shall not be irrevocable for a period of more than one
year, or beyond the termination date of the applicable collective bargaining
agreement, whichever occurs sooner." '49 The statute thus designates two times
at which an employee must be able to revoke a checkoff authorization-the
anniversary date of the authorization itself, and the expiration of the col-
lective bargaining agreement. But section 302(c)(4)'s confusing double neg-
ative has caused several problems of interpretation.
The first question to arise was whether it required an employee to execute
a new wage assignment every year. Section 302(c)(4) had been construed by
its legislative detractors as imposing such a requirement. Senator Ives' con-
cern, for example, was centered on the inconvenience to employers which
45. DOJ Opinion, supra note 37, at 47.
46. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1988). See NLRB v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 307 F.2d 3, 16 (3d
Cir. 1962) (in enforcing Board order against unfair labor practice of checking off strike
assessment, the court approved the Board's position "that it is of paramount importance that
only the non-payment of 'periodic dues and initiation fees' to the exclusion of assessments
[such as the strike assessment] shall constitute the criterion upon which discharge from em-
ployment for non-union membership may be enforced.").
47. International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 326 F.2d 916, 920 (2d Cir.
1964).
48. Id.
49. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(4) (1982).
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would result from the need for annual reauthorization. 0 Checkoff authori-
zations, however, commonly provide that they will be automatically renewed
unless they are expressly revoked during certain so-called "window periods"
before or after the two times designated by the statute-the authorization's
anniversary and the termination of the collective bargaining agreement.' The
Justice Department memorandum interpreting section 302(c)(4), by reading
the statute narrowly, concluded that because such an authorization was not
by its terms "irrevocable" for a period of more than a year, it was legal .
2
The courts have consistently concurred with that interpretation,53 at least to
the extent of holding that new signatures are not needed every year.
5 4
Moreover, although a premature revocation will not be effective at the time
it is made, it will prevent the authorization from being automatically renewed
at the end of the year."
50. 93 CONG. REC. 4875, 4878 (1947), reprinted in LEGIS. HIST., supra note 9, at 1315.
Senator Ives stated:
I am sure, moreover, that many employers will not be particularly pleased with
that feature of the provision as here presented, which requires each employee, at
least once a year, to specify in writing that he wants the check-off continued. This
would add to the bedevilment of employers, who already are overburdened by paper
work, by the number of reports, and other documents they have to prepare and
submit, and the numerous procedures to which they are subjected.
Id. See also McNatt, supra note 10, at 124 ("it was obvious that neither the employer, the
employee or the union wanted to undertake the tremendous administrative burden this annual
renewal would involve").
51. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(4) (1982).
52. DOJ Opinion, supra, note 37, at 47.
53. See, e.g., Hayes v. Local No. 12, United Rubber Workers, 523 F. Supp. 50, 54 (N.D.
Ala. 1981) (authorization providing for automatic renewal gave employees the right to revoke
during the window periods required by section 302 and "[t]here is no statutory right of an
employee to effect, at whatever time he pleases, a non-anniversary revocation of his authori-
zation"); Monroe Lodge No. 770, IAM v. Litton Business Systems, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 310,
314 (W.D. Va. 1971) (automatic renewal clause contained in authorization with window periods
at the anniversary date and the termination of the collective bargaining agreement did not
deprive employee of right to change his mind about dues checkoff after one year), aff'd, 523
F.2d 783 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 879 (1972); Brooks v. Continental Can Corp.,
59 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2779, 2782 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (in rejecting attack upon automatic renewal
clause of authorization, the court noted that the employee was free to reconsider "whether or
not he wanted the assignment in effect and irrevocable for each succeeding year," and the
automatic renewal clause was in both the collective bargaining agreement and the authorization
which the employee had executed, thereby protecting the employee's freedom of choice (citing
Felter v. Southern Pac. Co., 359 U.S. 326, 334 (1959))).
54. Whether these automatically renewed authorizations remain absolutely irrevocable for
another year is a separate issue. See infra sources cited in Parts-D, E & F.
55. Monroe Lodge 770, IAM, 334 F. Supp. at 316-17. The employer received many
revocations from employees dissatisfied with an increase in their dues during the last months
of the first year of the collective bargaining agreement and several months of its second year.
Id. at 312. The window period was fifteen days within the anniversary date or the expiration
of the collective bargaining agreement, but the employer honored the revocations without regard
to their date. As to the revocations submitted before the expiration of the contract's first year,
the court stated that "there can be no doubt that the Company was wrong in honoring these
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2. Hiatus of Collective Bargaining Agreement
Revocations that occur during a so-called "hiatus" period, i.e., when no
collective bargaining agreement is in effect, have caused enormous problems
of contract and statutory interpretation. In Murtha v. Pet Dairy Products
Co.,5 6 the Tennessee Court of Appeals held that an employee may revoke
at will during this period. The checkoff authorization in Murtha provided
that it was irrevocable:
[F]or the term of the applicable contract .. .or for one year, which ever
is the lesser, and shall automatically renew itself for successive yearly or
applicable contract periods thereafter, whichever is the lesser, unless I give
written notice ... at least 60 days and not more than 75 days before any
periodic renewal date .. .of my desire to revoke the same. 7
After the contract expired, the parties agreed to continue its provisions in
effect until they reached a new agreement. During that period, however,
many employees attempted to revoke their checkoff authorizations. The
court held that revocation according to the terms of the authorization would
be literally impossible because during the hiatus period the termination dates
of not only the verbal extension of the expired contract, but also of the
contract which was still being negotiated, were both indeterminate s. 5  Thus,
the court concluded that the authorizations were necessarily revocable at
will.
The court did not address the question of why the fifteen-day window
period specified in the authorization could not have been established by
reference to each authorization's anniversary date. Indirectly, an answer to
this can be found in Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Local 822,59 a later decision of the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit. After the collective bargaining agreement expired several
employees attempted to revoke their checkoff authorizations, which provided
for fifteen-day window periods, as had been the case in Murtha. The union
argued that because the revocations, which were submitted during the hiatus
between contracts, did not fall within the fifteen-day window period prior
to either the anniversary of the authorization, or the expiration date of the
old contract, the authorizations had been automatically renewed for another
year.
revocations." Id. at 314. Those revocations submitted during the second year of the contract
were also ineffective as to that year, but they did "[give] the Company and the Union notice
of the employees' desire to discontinue the deductions, and it was unnecessary for the employees
to resubmit revocations during the fifteen day period at the end of the second year." Id. at
317 (citing Felter v. Southern Pac. Co., 359 U.S. 326, 335 (1959)).
56. 44 Tenn. App. 460, 314 S.W.2d 185 (1958).
57. Id. at 465, 314 S.W.2d at 189 (unofficial reporter diverges).
58. Id. at 471, 314 S.W.2d at 190 (employees "were unable to determine either the 'ter-
mination date' of the verbal agreement [which was of indefinite duration], or the 'periodic
renewal date' of the new contract [which had not yet been agreed to]").
59. 584 F.2d 41 (4th Cir. 1978).
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The employer, on the other hand, argued that the revocations were effective
for two closely related reasons, one contractual and the other statutory.
First, the employer argued that, as in Murtha, once the contract expired it
was impossible to determine a renewal date against which to measure the
window period. Furthermore, as in Murtha, the terms of the checkoff
authorization with respect to revocation became irrelevant, making the au-
thorization revocable at will. In response to the union's claim that the window
period could still be established by reference to the authorization anniversary
date, the employer argued that if one of the two possible periods for
rdvocation becomes incapable of ascertainment, the entire revocation limi-
tation provision fails, making the authorization revocable at will.
60
Second, the employer also argued that, regardless of how the authorization
should be construed, the employees had an absolute statutory right to revoke
their checkoff authorizations at the expiration of the contract. Essentially,
the employer's statutory argument was that a window period, which opened
up some two months in advance of the actual expiration of the collective
bargaining agreement, did not satisfy the statutory requirement that the
authorization be revocable upon the expiration of the contract.
6
'
In a somewhat cryptic decision, the Fourth Circuit upheld the right of the
employer to honor the revocations. The court relied on Murtha for the
proposition that an authorization is revocable at will when it becomes
impossible to determine "one of the times" that the authorization and the
statute allow for revocation. 62 But the court also apparently agreed with the
60. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 20-21. The employer argued:
The short answer to this contention is that the authorization contract between the
member and the Union guarantees to the member two escape periods and the
Union's construction would render one of them meaningless. In addition, the
Union's authorization form states that the employee will be permitted to select the
shortest of the two escape periods and the Union's construction would simply read
this employee right completely out of the authorization contract. Superimposed
upon the commitments contained in the Union's authorization contract is the
requirement of Section 186(c)(4) [section 302(c)(4)] which states that the authori-
zation shall not be irrevocable for the lesser of two distinct periods, one of which
is inextricably related to the existence of a collective agreement of a definite term.
To construe the contract as the Union would construe it, would simply amount to
a wholesale rewriting of the authorization contract so as to permit only one annual
escape period and thus place the authorization in direct contravention of the
statutory mandate contained in Section 186(c)(4) [section 302(c)(4)].
Id.
61. Id. at 24-25. The employer also pointed out that the Justice Department memorandum
which gave approval to automatically renewing checkoff authorizations referred only to annual
renewals prior to the anniversary date of the authorization. Id. at 2. The employer thus argued
that the memorandum did not address the issue of whether an authorization could be auto-
matically renewed if an employee failed to revoke during a window period prior to the expiration
of the contract.
62. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 822, 584 F.2d 41, 44
(4th Cir. 1978) (citing Murtha v. Pet Dairy Prods. Co., 44 Tenn. App. 460, 314 S.W.2d 185
(1957)).
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employer's broader argument that the statute absolutely guarantees a right
to revoke an authorization at the expiration of the collective bargaining
agreement and, implicitly, that this right cannot be waived or defeated by
the terms of the checkoff authorization itself.63 The court thus concluded
that the statute "guaranteed the employees the right to revoke their checkoff
authorizations at will during the hiatus between collective bargaining agree-
ments. ' ' 6 In effect, the Anheuser-Busch decision held that during the final
year of a contract an employee may revoke this type of checkoff authori-
zation at three distinct times: the window period before the anniversary date,
the window period before the expiration of the contract, and upon the
expiration of the contract. 61
The Murtha and Anheuser-Busch cases both involved checkoff authori-
zations that allowed revocations only during window periods that opened up
prior to the expiration of the contract. Because the statute also allows
revocation upon expiration of the contract, the courts allowed revocations
during the entire contract hiatus period. It would appear, however, that as
long as some revocation at expiration of the collective bargaining agreement
is provided for, the checkoff authorization may otherwise limit or define it.
For example, in Hayes v. Local No. 12, United Rubber Workers,66 the
authorization allowed revocation during a ten day window period following
63. Id. (citing Atlanta Printing Specialties, 215 N.L.R.B. 237, 238 (1974) (a premature
extension of a collective bargaining agreement cannot defeat the right of an employee to revoke
under a window period determined by reference to the expiration date of the old contract),
enforced, 523 F.2d 783, 788 (5th Cir. 1975) (section 302(c)(4) "guarantees employees an
opportunity to revoke dues checkoff authorizations at the expiration of each collective bargaining
agreement.")).
64. 584 F.2d at 43. The court also rejected the union's claim that checkoff agreements and
collective bargaining agreements are totally independent covenants, thus suggesting that section
302 makes a checkoff agreement valid only if it is pursuant to an in-force collective bargaining
agreement. Certainly, the language and structure of section 302(c)(4) would indicate that
Congress contemplated that checkoff agreements would operate in that context. This interpre-
tation is reinforced by the fact that the abuses section 302 was designed to correct are more
likely to occur where the relationship between the employer and the union is not formalized
and constrained by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. In that situation, the section
302(c)(4) exception for the checkoff of membership dues should also not apply.
65. The union had argued that the creation of this "third open period" was contrary to
the intent of Congress. Reply Brief for Defendant-Appellant Local 822, at 6-7.
66. 523 F. Supp. 50 (N.D. Ala. 1981). The dispute between the employer and the union as
to the date appropriate to determination of the window period relative to expiration of the
contract was centered on the issue of whether the old contract expired on the date which it
specified for its termination or instead whether the old contract expired on the date, some four
months later, on which the new agreement became effective at the plant where the plaintiff
employees worked. Id. at 52-53. The union had prevailed in arbitration, with the arbitrator's
award including the finding that the old contract had expired according to the date it specified,
and therefore he ruled that "non-anniversary revocations not received within the window period
following [the contract's specified termination date] were to be deemed untimely." Id. at 53
(emphasis added). For a discussion of the role of arbitration under federal labor policy, see
infra Part IV.
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either the anniversary of the authorization or the termination of the contract.
The court held that revocations at other times during the hiatus period were
ineffective.
Although that result is entirely consistent with the rule of Murtha and
Anheuser-Busch that employees have a statutory right to revoke upon the
expiration of the contract, in explaining its decision, the court used language
that suggests disagreement with the three-revocation period analysis of those
cases. The court explained that section 302(c)(4) provides for two opportu-
nities for revocation-one on the anniversary date, and the other on the
date of the contract's termination. 67 However, "[tihere is no statutory right
of an employee to effect, at whatever time he pleases, a non-anniversary
revocation of his authorization. ' 6a If applied to the facts of Murtha and
Anheuser-Busch, that language would suggest a result that was different
from the one that was reached in those cases. Thus, the only certainty under
section 302(c)(4) as construed by the Board and the courts is that the right
of an employee to revoke a checkoff authorization during a contract hiatus
period remains somewhat uncertain.
C. Enforcement Mechanisms
Section 302 itself does not contain a mechanism for enforcing checkoff
agreements. Rather, it operates as a limit on them. If, however, a collective
bargaining agreement does contain a checkoff provision, then it can be
enforced in district court under section 301.69 If the agreement also contains
an arbitration provision, then section 301 will require that the question first
be resolved by an arbitrator.70 If the arbitrator holds that the employer is
liable to the union for the dues it has not withheld and forwarded, then the
67. 523 F. Supp. at 54 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(4) (1982)). The court also stated, "[als
the statute requires, each class member in the case at bar is accorded the right to revoke his
authorization at least once every year; and in some situations, such employees may revoke
during two separate window periods in those years in which the contract terminates." Id.
68. Id. at 54. The court stated, "[tlhe parties ... were free to utilize the contract termination
date as the beginning of the window period for non-anniversary revocations, without offending
the [employees'] statutory rights." Id. See also Associated Press v. NLRB, 492 F.2d 662, 666
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (upholding NLRB deferral to an arbitration decision which disallowed non-
anniversary revocations during a contract hiatus period).
69. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982). Section 301 is the statutory provision which gives federal district
courts jurisdiction over the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. Section 185(a)
provides in part:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees .. .may be brought in any district court of the United
States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy
or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a).
70. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960)
(an "order to arbitrate [a] particular grievance [arising under a collective bargaining agreement]
should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause
is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute").
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usual remedy would be for the employer to be required to pay the union
that amount, and this may be without any right of recoupment against the
employees. If recoupment is not allowed and the union attempts to have the
award enforced in federal court under section 301, then the employer is
likely to defend on the grounds that the award orders it to do something
which violates section 302.
The employer's argument is as follows: it is being ordered "to pay ...
money ... to [the] labor organization .. .which represents .. .employees
of such employer."'" Section 302 declares this to be unlawful, and since the
payment does not come from money that has been deducted from the wages
of the employees, it does not fall within the subsection (c)(4) exemption. In
United Steelworkers v. United States Gypsum Co.,72 the district court ac-
cepted the logic of that argument. It therefore modified the arbitration award
in that case to allow the employer to deduct the money from the future
wages of the affected employees. 3
The court of appeals held, however, that although the required payment
did not fall within the checkoff exception of section (c)(4), it was nonetheless
covered by the section (c)(2) exception with respect to the payment of money
pursuant to an award of an arbitrator.7 4 The court further held that the
arbitrator did not exceed his remedial authority by requiring the employer
to pay the money without recoupment from the employees. 71 The District of
Columbia Court of Appeals recently reached the same conclusion in Wash-
ington Post v. Washington-Baltimore Newspaper Guild, Local 35.16
71. 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1982).
72. 339 F. Supp. 302, 308 (N.D. Ala. 1972) ("such a ruling [is] . . .clearly in violation of
29 U.S.C. § 186(a), that is, insofar as dues for persons still in its employ and hence subject to
payroll deductions. The object is to compensate the [union] for its loss, not to penalize ...
the [employer]"), reversed in relevant part, 492 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
998 (1974).
73. 339 F. Supp. at 308. The court, however, did not adhere rigorously to the logic of its
position. With respect to employees who were no longer employed, the court said that "the
burden of recompense must be borne by the defendant as in the nature of damages caused the
union by its actions." Id.
74. 492 F.2d 713, 734 (5th Cir. 1974). This exception applies to:
[Tihe payment or delivery of any money or other thing of value in satisfaction of
a judgment of any court or a decision or award of an arbitrator or impartial
chairman or in compromise, adjustment, settlement, or release of any claim, com-
plaint, grievance, or dispute in the absence of fraud or duress.
29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(2) (1982).
75. 492 F.2d at 734.
76. 787 F.2d 604, 608-09 (D.C. Cir. 1986). The issue was whether section 302 precluded an
arbitrator from ordering an employer to reimburse a union for dues lost as a consequence of
the employer's breach of the collective bargaining agreement. The court upheld the arbitration
award. Id. at 605. After one of the paper's managing editors told four columnists that they
were excluded from the bargaining unit under the contract, the columnists resigned from the
union and revoked their checkoff authorizations. Id. The arbitrator ruled that the columnists
were not excluded from the unit under the contract, and as a remedy ordered the paper to
reimburse the union for its lost dues. The employer's lawsuit claimed that this award violated
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A problem related to enforcement of the checkoff may also arise when
the employer has faithfully withheld dues, but there are two unions claiming
entitlement to the money. In this situation it would appear that an employer
should be allowed to bring an interpleader action under either Rule 22 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or 28 U.S.C. § 1335.11 However, in
Sun Shipbuilding & Dry-Dock Co. v. Industrial Union of Marine Workers,78
the court dismissed an employer's statutory interpleader action in a checkoff
dispute of this kind. The collective bargaining agreement, to which both the
international and the local were parties, required the employer to checkoff
and forward dues to the local. When members of the local disaffiliated
themselves from the international and took all the property and assets with
them, the international appointed a new set of provisional officers for the
local. Both groups claimed entitlement to the monies which had been checked
off and the employer therefore brought an interpleader action. The court's
primary concern was in finding jurisdiction. There was no diversity of
citizenship and the court held that the dispute did not arise under section
301. Rather, the court viewed the matter as a "family squabble ' 79 between
the two union groups over who was entitled to the money and noted,
"[o]bviously, this dispute did not arise out of a violation of any collective
bargaining agreement.''80
What the court ignored, however, was that the employer was potentially
liable under the collective bargaining agreement to one or the other of these
two union groups, and that either one of them could have brought an action
to collect the money under section 301. In other words, there was a dispute
between the employer and these two union groups, it grew out of the
collective bargaining agreement, section 301 gave the federal courts jurisdic-
tion over that dispute, and an interpleader action was thus appropriate to
resolve the competing claims to the dues.81
III. SECTION 8 REQUIREMENTS
A. Generally
Section 8 of the Act, which defines employer and union unfair labor
practices, does not refer specifically to checkoff arrangements. But such
section 302(c)(4) because the requisite authorizations had been revoked. The court upheld the
arbitrator's award because section 302 has several alternative exceptions, and in this case section
302(c)(2) provided for payments from employers to unions in satisfaction of such awards. Id.
at 606-07.
77. FED. R. Civ. P. 22 provides that "[plersons having claims against the plaintiff may be
joined as defendants and required to interplead when their claims are such that the plaintiff is
or may be exposed to double or multiple liability." There is also a statutory provision which
allows for interpleader, 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1982), which differs from Rule 22 primarily in that
it requires that there be "[tiwo or more adverse claimants, of diverse citizenship."
78. 95 F. Supp. 50 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
79. Id. at 53.
80. Id. (emphasis added).
81. Cf. General Electric Co. v. Emspak, 94 F. Supp. 601 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (allowing an
interpleader action to resolve a dispute between an employer and two union groups).
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arrangements nevertheless implicate almost every part of section 8. This part
of the Article discusses the following six unfair labor practice issues: the
checkoff as a mandatory subject of collective bargaining; the employees'
right to be free from coercion; the problem of a hiatus between contracts;
the effect of employee resignations from the union on the power to revoke
checkoff authorization; additional factors bearing on revocability; and fi-
nally, monetary remedies for unfair labor practices involving the checkoff.
A brief overview of these issues and the statutory framework precedes this
part's more detailed discussion.
Checkoff arrangements are a mandatory subject of collective bargaining,
thus requiring good faith negotiations under section 8(a)(5)12 and 8(b)(3) of
the Act. 3 An employer violates section 8(a)(l) (interference with the em-
ployee's right to not support the union),84 section 8(a)(2) (illegal employer
support of the union),8" and section 8(a)(3) (illegal employer encouragement
of union membership) 6 if it agrees to a checkoff arrangement with a minority
union (one which does not have the support of a majority of the employees
in the bargaining unit as their exclusive representative) or a union that it
dominates or controls, or if it requires or encourages employees to sign a
checkoff authorization form, or if it simply checks off union dues without
the proper employee authorization. On the other hand, by refusing to honor
a valid authorization, the employer breaches the section 8(d) duty to observe
the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. 7
82. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to
refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions
of section 159(a) of this title." Collective bargaining is described in 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982)
"in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment."
Id. See infra notes 100 and 103 for a discussion of the concept of mandatory subjects of
bargaining.
83. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1982) makes it an unfair labor practice for a union "to refuse
to bargain collectively with an employer, provided [the union] is the representative of his
employees." Id.
84. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in [section
7 of the NLRA]." Id. Section 7 of the NLRA provides in pertinent part.
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection, and [may also refrain from such activities unless
affected by an agreement requiring membership as a condition of employment].
Id.
85. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1982) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to
dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or
contribute financial or other support to it." Id.
86. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982) provides that an employer commits an unfair labor practice
"by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of
employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization." Id.
87. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982) defines the duty to bargain collectively as including the
requirement that "no party to such contract shall terminate or modify such contract." Id.
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On the union's side, if it coerces an employee into signing a checkoff
authorization or causes an employer to checkoff dues when the employee
has not properly authorized it, this will constitute interference with the
employee's right to refrain from union activity in violation of section
8(b)(1)(A); s8 it will also violate the section 8(b)(2)8 9 prohibition against causing
an employer to engage in conduct encouraging union membership, mentioned
above. Thus, the checkoff raises issues under almost every part of section 8
of the NLRA.
The unfair labor practice aspects of checkoff arrangements did not, how-
ever, become a major issue until after passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in
1947. Prior to that time, the general rule was that a checkoff agreement
violated the statute only if it was made with an organization that was
company-dominated, or which for some other reason did not represent an
uncoerced majority of the employees. 90 The 1947 amendments changed that
rule in two ways.
First, under the original National Labor Relations Act, employers and
unions were free to negotiate "closed shop" agreements, requiring actual
union membership as a condition of initial employment. 9' To ensure that
the employees always satisfied the financial obligations of this coerced
membership, unions also frequently negotiated mandatory nonrevocable
checkoff arrangements on behalf of the entire membership. 92 When the 1947
amendments limited the scope and nature of permissible union security
arrangements, 9a checkoff arrangements became analogously constrained.
Second, section 302 itself provided the impetus for a more expansive
reading of some of the unfair labor practice sections. The Board openly
denies that section 302 has had this effect. It has consistently taken the
position that "the limitations on checkoff in section 302 were intended
neither to create a new unfair labor practice, nor even to be considered in
determining whether checkoff violates section 8 of the Act." '94 Thus, the
88. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1982). "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization or its agents-(l) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 157." Id.
89. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1982) makes it an unfair labor practice for a union:
[Tlo cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in
violation of subsection (a)(3) or to discriminate against an employee with respect
to whom membership in such organization has been denied or terminated on some
ground other than his failure to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees
uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership ....
Id.
90. See, e.g., Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533 (1943).
91. T. HAGGARD, supra note 4, at 34.
92. See 3 L. TELLER, LABOR DISPUTES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 1633 (1940) (sample
form of collective bargaining agreement checkoff provision for employer to make deductions
from union members as well as nonmembers).
93. See supra note 4 for the text of section 8(a)(3).
94. Salant & Salant, Inc., 88 N.L.R.B. 816, 817 (1950). This conclusion was based on three
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Board has consistently adhered to the position that merely because a checkoff
arrangement is not illegal under section 302 does not necessarily mean that
it is also not illegal under a section 8 analysis. 9 Reading section 8 more
broadly than section 302 has been justified on the grounds that while the
former merely involves an unfair labor practice, the latter carries with it the
possibility of criminal penalties. 9 A
On the other hand, despite its claims to the contrary, the Board clearly has
read into section 8 the section 302 requirement that the authorizations be
voluntary and that they not be irrevocable for longer than a year.97 This
infusion of section 302's terms into section 8 can be justified, however, on the
grounds that if employer and union conduct violates the civil and potentially
criminal provisions of section 302, it necessarily falls under the section 8(a)(1)
prohibition against restraint, interference, and coercion of employees in the
exercise of their section 7 rights to refrain from union activity.
B. The Duty to Bargain Over Checkoff Arrangements
1. Checkoff as a Mandatory Subject of Bargaining
The first section 8 issue involves the status of the checkoff as a subject
of collective bargaining.9" Employers and unions alike have a duty under the
factors: (1) The original House version of the Bill, which was not adopted in this regard, made
checkoffs that did not meet certain requirements an unfair labor practice; (2) the restrictions
on checkoff that were adopted appear in an entirely different title from that containing the
unfair labor practices; and (3) section 302 provides for its own specific methods for enforcing
the prohibition against certain kinds of checkoff. Id. at 817-18. See also Frito-Lay, Inc., 243
N.L.R.B. 137, 138 (1979) (violation of section 302(c)(4) is not per se an unfair labor practice);
Baggett Indus. Constr., Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. 171, 172 (1975) ("since [Salant and Salant], the
Board has consistently held that failure to comply with the requirements of Section 302 does
not constitute an unfair labor practice" and can not be considered when deciding whether
checkoff violates section 8); Bisso Towboat Co., Inc., 192 N.L.R.B. 885, 886 (1971) ("violations
of Section 302 are not per se violations of Section 8(a)(2)").
95. Kresge Dept. Store, 77 N.L.R.B. 212, 214 (1948) (section 302 does not legitimatize the
contribution of support to labor unions which are illegal under section 8(a)(2)).
96. See, e.g., NLRB v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 498 F.2d 1105, 1107-08 (5th Cir. 1974)
(severance of employment also severs obligations of checkoff and mere fact of legality under
section 302 not determinative of section 8 issue); NLRB v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 307 F.2d 3,
12 (3d Cir. 1962) (broad construction of section 302 is consistent with criminal penalties for its
violation, while narrow construction of sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2) is consistent with protection
of employees intended to be afforded and is "completely extrinsic" to the enforcement of
section 302); NLRB v. Penn Cork & Closures, Inc., 376 F.2d 52, 55 (2d Cir. 1967) ("Congress'
determination that only certain checkoff arrangements should give rise to criminal penalties, §
302(d), or be enjoinable, § 302(e), did not immunize all others from scrutiny under § 8 by the"
NLRB), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 843 (1967).
97. See, e.g., Atlanta Printing Specialties Union, Local 527 (The Mead Corp.), 215 N.L.R.B.
237, 238 (1974) (concluding that the union violated section 8(b) by "causing the Employer to
dishonor the employees' revocation notices . . ., thus restraining and coercing the employees in
the exercise of their statutory right to revoke their checkoff authorizations" within the previ-
ously-established revocation period), enforced, 523 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1975).
98. See generally Comment, Union Dues Checkoff as a Subject in Labor-Management
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Act to bargain in "good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment," 99 and the refusal to do so is an unfair labor
practice.?° Determining whether a particular topic fits within those statutory
terms has not been an easy task for the Board and the courts, and checkoff
proposals exemplify this difficulty.
Prior to the Taft-Hartley Act amendments to the NLRA, there was a split
of authority with respect to whether or not the checkoff was a mandatory
subject of bargaining. In NLRB v. Reed & Prince Manufacturing,°10 the
First Circuit implicitly recognized that it was, apparently because checkoff
issues had frequently been dealt with in contract negotiations. 102 The Supreme
Court was later to adopt that criterion in Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.
v. NLRB as one of the touchstones of a mandatory subject of bargaining. 03
Negotiations: Good Faith Bargaining and NLRB Remedies, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 299, 300-04
(1970) (the Board and most courts agree that dues checkoff is a mandatory subject of bar-
gaining); Note, Check-off of Union Dues Under the NLRA-A Federally Protected Bargaining
Issue, 26 IND. L.J. 443, 447 (1951) (deduction of membership dues traditionally has been a
subject of negotiations, and therefore falls within the duty to bargain).
99. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982).
100. Section 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982) makes it an unfair labor practice for an
employer to refuse "to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject
to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title." Id. Collective bargaining is described in 29
U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982), "in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other
conditions of employment." Id. Similarly, the section 8(d) definition of collective bargaining
refers to "wages, hours, and other terms of conditions of employment," thus limiting the duty
to bargain to subjects which fall within that description. The union's correlative duty to bargain
is set forth in section 8(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1982) (unfair labor practice for union "to
refuse to bargain collectively with an employer," provided that it is the exclusive representative
of the employees under section 9(a), § 159(a)). This Article refers to the employer's statutory
obligation to collectively bargain under sections 8(a)(5) and 8(d) as the "duty to bargain."
101. 118 F.2d 874 (ist Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 595 (1941).
102. Id. at 883 (clause in contract that union and employees agree not to request checkoff
system "would have been illegal as against the public policy expressed in the Act, in that it
forestalled future collective bargaining upon matters which were 'frequent subjects of negotiation
between employers and employees.' " (quoting National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350
(1940))). See also NLRB v. Whittier Mills Co., 123 F.2d 725, 728 (5th Cir. 1941) (employer's
refusal to agree to checkoff was not unlawful refusal to bargain because neither the Board nor
the courts can make collective bargaining agreements for the parties, nor can they prescribe
any terms of such agreements); M. T. Stevens & Sons Co., 68 N.L.R.B. 229, 230 (1946)
(employer had not foreclosed possibility of future bargaining on checkoff provision, and to
have done so would have been unlawful because provision is a "proper subject for collective
bargaining").
103. 379 U.S. 203, 211 (1964). The Fibreboard Court stated:
While not determinative, it is appropriate to look to industrial bargaining practices
in appraising the propriety of including a particular subject within the scope of
mandatory bargaining. Industrial experience is not only reflective of the interests
of labor and management in the subject matter but is also indicative of the
amenability of such subjects to the collective bargaining process.
Id. (footnote omitted). First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981), is the
key Supreme Court decision on mandatory subjects of bargaining. The duty to bargain attaches
"only if the subject proposed for discussion is amenable to resolution through the bargaining
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On the other hand, in Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB104 the Fifth Circuit
denied that an employer has a statutory duty to bargain with a union over
a checkoff arrangement. Apparently, the court's theory was that this did
not involve a relationship between employer and employee vis-a-vis wages,
hours, or working conditions. Rather, the court indicated that the union's
financial support was purely a matter between the union and its members.' 0'
This reasoning is similar to the test that the Supreme Court later used in
NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg- Warner Corp., where the Court suggested
that a mandatory subject of bargaining is one which "regulates the relations
between the employer and the employees" and not one which "deals only
with relations between the employees and their unions."' °
Although legitimate arguments could thus be made on both sides of the
issue, after the Taft-Hartley Act amendments, the Board concluded that
Congress clearly intended for union proposals concerning a checkoff ar-
rangement to be a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. In United
States Gypsum Co., 0 7 the Board found that the company had not bargained
in good faith over a variety of subjects, including the checkoff. In a footnote,
the Board recognized the prior split of authority but said, "we are satisfied
from the language and legislative history of the 1947 amendments that
Congress intended that the bargaining obligation contained in Section 8(a)(5)
should apply to checkoff."' ' 0 The Board then cited, without discussion, four
pieces of legislative history-none of which, however, is conclusive of the
issue.' °9 Nevertheless, since then, the Board and the courts have consistently
process." Id. at 678. The Court articulated a balancing test which mandates "bargaining over
management decisions that have a substantial impact on the continued availability of employment
• . . only if the benefit, for labor-management relations and the collective-bargaining process,
outweighs the burden placed on the [employer's] conduct of the business." Id. at 679. See
Turner, Predecision Bargaining and the Core of Entrepreneurial Control. The Ups and Downs
of Otis Elevator, 39 DE PAUL L. REv. 43 (1989) (discussing recent Board and court decisions
on mandatory bargaining subjects and examining the need for a definitive test to replace the
various approaches taken by Board members in Otis Elevator Co., 269 N.L.R.B. 891 (1984)).
104. 147 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1945).
105. Id. at 74. In determining that the collection of dues was not a mandatory bargaining
subject, the court stated that "[tlhe Act makes no provision for paying the [union]. Where a
union serves as such, it looks for its financial support to the agreement of its members to pay
dues. The law gives no lien on the wages for the dues." Id.
106. 356 U.S. 342, 349-50 (1958). See also Chemical & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 178 (1971) ("In general terms, [the duty to bargain] includes only
those issu.es that settle an aspect of the relationship between the employer and the employees.").
See supra notes 100 & 103 for discussion of mandatory bargaining subjects.
107. 94 N.L.R.B. 112 (1951).
108. Id. at 113 n.7.
109. The first reference was to the page in the original House version of the amendments
where mandatory subjects are specifically listed. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1947),
reprinted in LEGIs. HIST., supra note 9, at 166-67. The checkoff is not mentioned. Second, the
Board also cited the Minority House Report on the House version of the bill which specifically
noted that "[i]t seems clear that the definitions are designed to exclude collective bargaining
concerning . . . check-off provisions . . . and a host of other matters traditionally the subject
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regarded the checkoff as a mandatory subject of bargaining. °10
2. "Good Faith" Bargaining
The more difficult question has been what constitutes "good faith" bar-
gaining over the checkoff. The law's attempt to legislate a state of mind has
been regarded by many as an exercise in futility,"' and the cases dealing
with bargaining over the checkoff provide a classic example of why this
might be so. "Good faith" has been defined as "a bonafide intent to reach
an agreement if agreement is possible.""112 Despite the statutory prohibition
against requiring an employer to make concessions or agree to any particular
proposal," 3 the Board and the courts look with a jaundiced eye upon
matter of collective bargaining." HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, LABOR-MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS ACT, 1947, H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1947), reprinted in LEOIs.
HIST., supra note 9, at 362. Third, the Board cited the House Conference Report summarizing
the House version in this regard and comparing it with the final version. H.R. CONF. REP. No.
510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1947), reprinted in LEGIS. HIST., supra note 9, at 538. Presumably,
the Board concluded from these three references that congressional rejection of the original
House version of the amendments meant that Congress intended for the checkoff to be a
mandatory subject. Finally, the Board also cited a page in the House report where it merely
referred to the prevalence of the checkoff in many plants. HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND
LABOR, LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
29 (1947), reprinted in LEOIS. HIST., supra note 9, at 320. Apparently, the Board read this as
some kind of congressional "approval" of checkoffs, thus making them a mandatory subject
of bargaining.
110. See, e.g., Caroline Farms Div. of Textron, Inc. v. NLRB, 401 F.2d 205, 210 (4th Cir.
1968) ("Union security, including dues checkoff, is a mandatory subject of bargaining"); NLRB
v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 136 (1st Cir. 1953) (although the court merely said
this was a "proper" subject for collective bargaining, this has been construed as meaning it
was mandatory rather than merely permissive), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953); Bethlehem
Steel Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1500, 1501-02 (1962) ("[tlhere can be little doubt that . . . checkoff
.. . affect[s], or may affect . . . 'wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment' "), enforcement denied on other grounds, 320 F.2d 615 (3d Cir. 1963).
111. See, e.g., LABOR STUDY GROUP, THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 82
(Committee for Economic Development, 1961).
Parties have been told that they must bargain in good faith, and elaborate tests
have been devised in an attempt to determine "objectively" whether the proper
subjective attitude prevails. The limitations and artificiality of such tests are ap-
parent, and the possibilities of evasion are almost limitless .... Basically, it is
unrealistic to expect that, by legislation, "good faith" can be brought to the
bargaining table.
Id.
112. Atlas Mills, Inc., 3 N.L.R.B. 10, 21 (1937); see also NLRB v. Gulf Power Co., 384
F.2d 822, 825 (5th Cir. 1967) (duty to bargain in good faith requires the parties to confer and
negotiate in a genuine effort to reach an agreement if it is possible to do so); NLRB v. Generac
Corp., 354 F.2d 625, 628 (7th Cir. 1965) ("Iglood faith means sincerity, candor and a willingness
to negotiate toward the possibility of effecting compromises"); Borg-Warner Controls, 198
N.L.R.B. 726, 729 (1972) (defining "bad faith" by reference to engaging in "bargaining
conferences with no intention of reaching agreement with the Union").
113. Section 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982) provides that the duty to bargain collectively
"does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession."
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employers who take an uncompromising position on a particular issue '1 4 and
who cannot advance legitimate business reasons for doing so.", This view
poses problems for the employer who does not want to agree to a checkoff
arrangement. Unlike wages and benefits, the checkoff is an either/or prop-
osition, over which there is little or no room for compromise. Additionally,
apart from cost and administrative inconvenience, which are relatively insig-
nificant, the checkoff implicates none of the usual business or operational
concerns that employers use to justify a bargaining position. 1 6
In drawing the line between "hard bargaining" and "bad faith bargaining"
over the checkoff, the Board and the courts look both at how the employer
bargains over this subject and why it refuses to agree to a checkoff, with
the focus being on the "overall pattern of conduct." 1 7 First, with respect
to the "how," an employer must at least be willing to consider all of the
union's checkoff proposals and alternative ways for collecting dues. For
example, in McLane Co."8 the union inquired if the company might accept
some modification in the wording of the provision, but the company said it
would not agree to a checkoff regardless of the form or language. Although
this statement was probably a realistic reflection of the employer's unalterable
opposition to the principle of the checkoff, the Board found it to be evidence
that the company was not bargaining with "an open mind."" '9 Conversely,
in Cone Mills Corp. 2 0 the Board was favorably impressed with the company's
willingness to consider alternative ways of collecting dues, even though the
administrative law judge ("ALJ") had dismissed these alternatives as being
totally unrealistic.' 2'
NLRB v. Reed & Prince Manufacturing, 22 provides another example of
how an employer's "bargaining" over the checkoff can fail to meet the test
of "good faith." The employer's position was to insist that the union waive
the right to ever request a checkoff at any time in the future, but the court
held that the waiver would have been of such duration as to limit the union
114. E.g., Borg-Warner Controls, 94 N.L.R.B. 112, 116 (1951) (intransigence on checkoff
among other issues was "further evidence of [the employer's] intention to avoid coming to any
agreement at all with the Union").
115. Roanoke Iron & Bridge Works, Inc., 160 N.L.R.B. 175, 181 (1966) (employer did not
bargain in good faith on checkoff because reasons were not "what appear[ed] to him to be
sound considerations of business . . . judgment"), enforced sub nom. United Steelworkers v.
NLRB, 390 F.2d 846, 852 n.l (D.C. Cir. 1967) (but also denying that "business purposes are
the only watchword for good faith"), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 904 (1968).
116. See supra notes 27-32.
117. Magic Chef, Inc., 286 N.L.R.B. No. 33, slip op. at 19, 130 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1027
(Sept. 30, 1987).
118. 166 N.L.R.B. 1036 (1967).
119. Id. at 1042.
120. 169 N.L.R.B. 449 (1968), order enforced in part and denied in part, 413 F.2d 445 (4th
Cir. 1969).
121. Id.
122. 118 F.2d 874 (1st Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 3i3 U.S. 595 (1941).
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in its role as the employees' exclusive representative. '23 In a later case,1 24 the
same company asserted that the checkoff was not a mandatory subject of
bargaining and that even if it were, the company had legitimate reasons for
refusing to agree to it. The Board and the court, however, concluded that
the employer's mistaken position as to its duty to bargain foreclosed its
ability to negotiate in good faith over the checkoff.
1 21
Similarly, there are limits on the employer's legitimate bargaining tactics
involving the checkoff. In Magic Chef, Inc., 26 the Board recognized that an
employer may use the checkoff as a bargaining chip, provided that there is
evidence of some actual willingness to agree to the checkoff if the union
will make other economic concessions. Such evidence was lacking in that
case, and the Board thus concluded that the employer's opposition was
merely intended to frustrate agreement and precipitate a strike.
In addition to how the employer conducts its bargaining, the second factor
relevant to the question of "good faith" is the employer's reasons for
refusing to agree to a checkoff. For example, in Kayser-Roth Hosiery Co.,'
27
at various times during the bargaining period the employer advanced every
conceivable reason for refusing to agree to a checkoff. When the union
effectively countered or responded to these objections, the employer's ulti-
mate fall-back position was that a checkoff was against "company policy."' 2
In addition to faulting the employer for constantly changing the grounds for
its objection to a checkoff, the Board also disallowed the "policy" argument,
stating that the argument had the effect of simply foreclosing all meaningful
discussion of the issue.' 29
Most employers do not even attempt to justify their position by reference
to cost or administrative inconvenience,'30 and even when these reasons have
123. Id. at 883 (the court stated that "[s]uch a provision would have tied the hands of the
Union for all time to come and thus would have impaired its efficacy as a collective bargaining
agency").
124. NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887
(1953).
125. Id. at 136 (the court stated, "an employer who takes the erroneous position that a
particular subject matter is not bargainable 'can hardly approach the discussion of this subject
with an open mind and a willingness to reach an agreement' ").
126. 286 N.L.R.B. No. 33, 130 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1027 (Sept. 30, 1987).
127. 176 N.L.R.B. 999 (1969), enforced, 430 F.2d 701 (6th Cir. 1970).
128. Id. at 1004.
129. Id.
130. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. NLRB (Roanoke Iron & Bridge Works, Inc.), 390
F.2d 846, 848 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (employer stated that "as a matter of 'principle' no cooperation
on dues collection would be given" as its only basis for opposing a checkoff provision), cert.
denied, 391 U.S. 904 (1968); United Steelworkers v. NLRB (H.K. Porter Co.), 363 F.2d 272,
275 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (reason given for denying union's request for checkoff provision was that
employer was "not going to aid and comfort the union"), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1036 (1967);
Cone Mills Corp., 169 N.L.R.B. 449, 457 (1968) (employer refused to grant the checkoff
because "it was not in the best interest of the Company"), order enforced in part and denied
in part, 413 F.2d 445 (4th Cir. 1969); Flowers Baking Co., 161 N.L.R.B. 1429, 1439 (1966)
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been raised, "bad faith" bargaining has still been found on other grounds. 3 '
Rather, the most common reason, though variously phrased, derives from
the disinclination to become involved in what the employer regards as the
"union's business." As one employer explained it, "the Union performed a
service and, if it continued to perform that service satisfactorily, it would
have no problem collecting its dues. It was not the business of the Company
to collect the union dues.' ' 3 2
An employer who disdains doing the union's business but who honors
payroll deductions for other purposes faces a possible claim of discrimina-
tion, from which bad faith can be inferred. For example, in Farmers Co-
Operative Gin Association'33 the employer refused to agree to a checkoff
even though it honored payroll deductions in repayment of loans to banks
and in payment to various merchants for goods purchased on credit. Al-
though the ALJ said that the employer's claim that the collection of dues
was the union's business was, on its face, a "valid position,"' 34 it still had
to be made in good faith. The ALJ then tartly observed that the collection
of bank loans and credit sales were also the business of the bank and the
merchant, and yet the employer cooperated with them.' The ALJ inferred
the employer's lack of good faith from the fact of this discrimination against
the union and the employees' union activities.3 6
The inference, however, is neither inexorable nor necessarily compelling.
There have been a number of cases where the employer honored payroll
deductions for a variety of purposes but nevertheless bargained successfully
(employer "adamantly refused to agree to a voluntary checkoff of union dues and initiation
fees, not because it was burdensome or inconvenient to do so, but on the sole ground that 'the
principle of deducting the Union's dues . . . does not appeal to us' ").
131. See, e.g., NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 136 (1st Cir.) (although
the employer stated that administration of a checkoff provision would be too much of a
bookkeeping burden, the court found the employer had bargained in bad faith), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 887 (1953); McLane Co., 166 N.L.R.B. 1036, 1038, 1042 (1967) (the Board found
that the employer had negotiated with the union in bad faith concerning checkoff even though
the employer cited a number of financial and administrative reasons for its opposition to
checkoff).
132. General Asbestos & Rubber Div., Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. 396, 406
(1967); see also NLRB v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 326 F.2d 832, 833 (5th Cir. 1964) ("The
Company repeatedly stated that it would not agree to a dues check-off clause, contending that
the collection of dues was a union obligation"); Jeffrey Stone Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 11, 15 (1968)
(employer's reason for failure to bargain over a checkoff clause, that it was "unwilling to
perform clerical services for the Union," was nondiscriminatory and the employer did not
commit an unfair labor practice); McGraw-Edison Co., 172 N.L.R.B. 1604, 1609 (1968)
(employer rejected union's request for checkoff on basis that it was union's business, not the
company's, to collect dues).
133. 161 N.L.R.B. 887 (1966).
134. Id. at 902.
135. Id. at 903.
136. Id. See also Alba-Waldensian, Inc., 167 N.L.R.B. 695, 716 (1967) (employer claimed
that if it agreed to a checkoff it would be blamed for employees' shrinkage of take-home pay,
but employer honored payroll deductions for other purposes without suffering that consequence).
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against a union dues checkoff provision. 3 7 Although the Board and the
courts have not attempted to explain it, employer "discrimination" in this
regard could be justified on a number of tangible albeit noneconomic
grounds. The checkoff may embroil the employer in disputes between the
union and its dissident members, with the employer being potentially guilty
of unfair labor practice charges regardless of whether it honors a checkoff
revocation or not, 3 ' or an employer may have legitimate reasons for not
wanting to know which of its employees are union members.3 9 These con-
siderations are simply lacking with respect to withholding wages for charitable
or commercial credit payments.'1°
3. Employer Unwillingness to Assist Union
The company advanced another controversial reason for refusing to agree
to a checkoff in H.K. Porter Co. 14, The company negotiator, after indicating
137. Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. NLRB, 432 F.2d 1341, 1342 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(company's ten year old policy of allowing only essential deductions was evidence that employer
did bargain in good faith over checkoff); General Asbestos & Rubber Div., Raybestos-Man-
hattan, Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. 396, 406 (1967) (although employer conceded that it "made numerous
deductions from wages for various purposes," the employer successfully bargained against
checkoff). But cf McGraw-Edison Co., 172 N.L.R.B. 1604, 1609 (1968) (although company
made deductions for savings bonds and its savings and profit sharing plans, because it did not
make deductions for private parties, and because union did not pursue request for checkoff,
employer had not bargained in bad faith); Cone Mills Corp., 169 N.L.R.B. 449, 457 (1968)
("The refusal of the checkoff of union dues while permitting it for such activities as the United
Fund, the credit union and United States bond[s] proves Respondent's desire to discriminate
against the representative of its employees."), order enforced in part and denied in part, 413
F.2d 445 (4th Cir. 1969).
138. See Kingston, Checkoff-Does it Ever Die?, 21 LAB. L.J. 159, 160 (1970).
139. See American Thread Co., 274 N.L.R.B. 1112, 1118 (1985) (although employer stated
reason for seeking discontinuance of checkoff clause was that it would not be able to ascertain
identity of union members, thereby preventing harassment and favoritism, the Board found
that its underlying purpose was to deter complaints and grievances-a reason proscribed by the
Act-and the employer thus violated sections 8(a)(l) and 8(a)(5)); Specialty Container Corp.,
171 N.L.R.B. 24, 28 (1968) (employer maintained an unwillingness to assist the union in dues
collection, explaining that it did not want to know which employees were union members).
140. Similarly, courts have allowed employer enforcement of no-solicitation/distribution rules
against union organizing activities even when the employer also makes exceptions for various
charitable solicitations. Despite the fact that this constitutes literal "discrimination" against
unionization activities, the nature of the solicitation justifies disparate enforcement. See, e.g.,
Restaurant Corp. v. NLRB, 801 F.2d 1390 (D.C. Cir. 1986). The employer maintained a no-
solicitation rule and two employees who violated it were fired. Id. at 1392. The union argued
that the employer's enforcement of the rule was discriminatory because six other nonunion
solicitations had been allowed during the year. The court held that the employer had not
discriminated against union activity because the nonunion solicitations were less disruptive. Id.
at 1394 (noting "instances of intra-employee generosity . . . on occasions such as birthdays or
departures.").
141. 153 N.L.R.B. 1370 (1965), enforced sub nom. United Steelworkers v. NLRB (Porter I),
363 F.2d 272 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 851 (1966), later proceedings, United Steel-
workers v. NLRB (H.K. Porter II), 389 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1967), on remand, 172 N.L.R.B.
966 (1968), enforced, 414 F.2d 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1969), reversed, 397 U.S. 99 (1970). See infra
notes 178-86 and accompanying text (discussing remedy aspect of case).
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that the collection of union dues was the union's business, also stated that
"he did not wish to give aid and comfort to the Union by assisting it in
collecting dues.' ' 42 The trial examiner held that this statement showed that
the employer had not bargained in good faith. 4 The trial examiner based
this conclusion on the fact that granting recognition to the union is itself a
form of "aid and comfort" and that conduct which disparages the union in
the eyes of the employees is an unfair labor practice.'" The Board and later
the court of appeals accepted the trial examiner's ultimate conclusion that
the employer's rejection of the checkoff proposal constituted an attempt to
frustrate the bargaining procedure and thus violated the Act. 45
The examiner's reasoning regarding recognition, however, is not persua-
sive. Employers have an express statutory duty to recognize the employees'
choice of bargaining representative,' 46 but they also have a statutory right
to refuse to agree to any particular contract term. 147 Moreover, a simple
refusal to assist the union, when there is no duty to do so, is a far cry from
active disparagement of the union in its role as a collective bargaining
representative. 4 1
Equally puzzling is the trial examiner's conclusion that the employer
evidenced bad faith when it suggested that the union attempt to obtain the
142. 153 N.L.R.B. at 1373. See also Alba-Waldensian, Inc., 167 N.L.R.B. 695, 716 (1967)
(employer "did not want to be placed in a position of appearing to the employees as assisting
the Union ...by agreeing to handle the dues deduction for it" and the Board found this
adamant stand against the checkoff to be evidence of bad faith).
143. 153 N.L.R.B. at 1374 (examiner stated that employer's position "evidences an attitude
inconsistent with the obligation imposed upon an employer by the Act").
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1370, 1373; United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 363 F.2d 272, 276 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 851 (1966).
146. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982). This section provides in pertinent part:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by
the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the
exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of
collective bargaining ....
Id.
147. Section 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982) (duty to bargain collectively "does not compel
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession"). The trial examiner
recognized this, but nevertheless deduced from the employer's refusal to agree, an intent to
make the bargaining fail, which he concluded was a violation of the duty to bargain in "good
faith" imposed by section 8(d). H.K. Porter Co., 153 N.L.R.B. at 1373.
148. On appeal, Judge Miller, in his dissent, dealt with the trial examiner's reasoning on a
slightly different basis:
He confused the union with its members and erroneously thought an employer is
somehow required to avoid any act which may disparage or discredit a union in
the eyes of the employees. The Act is for the benefit of employees and not unions
and, as Mr. Justice Rutledge said, "Nothing in the Act requires an employer to
maintain a union's prestige ......
United Steelworkers v. NLRB (Porter 1), 363 F.2d 272, 280 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Miller, J.,
dissenting) (quoting May Dept. Stores Co. v. NLRB, 326 U.S. 376, 398 (1945) (Rutledge, J.,
concurring in part)), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1036 (1967).
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checkoff provision through economic action rather than by filing an unfair
labor practice charge. 149 The trial examiner found the employer's position to
be contrary to the Act's policy of promoting economic peace. But the trial
examiner overlooked the fact that notwithstanding the general aim of avoid-
ing strikes through collective bargaining, the central premise of the Act is
that when the parties cannot agree on a term, its inclusion or exclusion in
the contract remains a function of economic strength. Furthermore, an
employer commits no unfair labor practice when it exploits its economic
strength in this context. 50 As the court put it in Atlas Metal Parts Co. v.
NLRB, 5' "[it is not illegal for a party to take advantage of a shift in
economic strength in a bona fide attempt to obtain agreement on original
proposals seen as furthering its best interest" including in that case an
opposition to the checkoff.1
2
Subsequently, in Roanoke Iron & Bridge Works, Inc., 53 another employer
also refused to agree to a checkoff as a matter of principle. However, after
reviewing the prior election campaign, the Board concluded that the employer
equated the checkoff with the union's survival and thus its refusal to agree
to the checkoff was intended to fatally weaken the union. 5 4 The Board
found this to constitute bad faith bargaining and the court of appeals
affirmed its order. The court concluded that the employer's attitude and the
manifestation of that attitude in the form of a refusal to agree to a checkoff
was inconsistent with the fundamental statutory duty to at least concede the
rightful existence of a certified union.' In a vigorous dissent, Judge, and
149. 153 N.L.R.B. at 1373.
150. See NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 488-89 (1960) (use of
economic weapons part of labor-management relations).
151. 660 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1981).
152. Id. at 309. See also NLRB v. Alva Allen Indus., Inc., 369 F.2d 310, 318 (8th Cir. 1966)
(adamant refusal to agree to a union security provision based on economic strength); O'Malley
Lumber Co., 234 N.L.R.B. 1171, 1179 (1978) (where an employer's economic strength increases
through withstanding a strike, "it is not unlawful for the employer to use its new-found strength
to secure contract terms that it deems beneficial"). But cf. Flowers Baking Co., 169 N.L.R.B.
738, 738 n.2 (1968) (employer maintained a firm position after surviving an unsuccessful strike
which the Board found to be evidence of an intent to make bargaining futile and "to disparage
and undermine the Union"), enforced, 418 F.2d 244 (5th Cir. 1969).
153. 160 N.L.R.B. 175 (1966), enforced sub nor. United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 390 F.2d
846 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 904 (1968).
154. Id. at 181 (employer's refusal "was grounded in the Company's belief that if it refused
the checkoff the Union would suffer and would probably again leave the scene").
155. Id. at 850-52. But see American Oil Co., 164 N.L.R.B. 36 (1967), where, in the absence
of any other evidence indicating an attempt to frustrate agreement, the Board held that when
the employer refused to "agree to [a] checkoff because it did not want to aid the Association,"
this constituted "a legitimate reason." Id. at 39. The Board reached this conclusion, moreover,
in spite of the fact that the employer's position on the checkoff was but a part of its broader
view that unionization itself was inappropriate for professional employees, a position which
comes very close to what some might regard as a repudiation of a fundamental duty under the
statute to at least recognize a union's legitimacy as a collective bargaining representative. Id.
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later Supreme Court Chief Justice, Burger regarded the employer's refusal
to agree to a checkoff, even if it was for the purpose of weakening the
union's bargaining strength, as a legitimate exercise of economic power. In
doing so, Burger noted "the accepted reality that collective bargaining is
more a practical-even brutal-economic confrontation than a statesmanlike
minuet.' 1316
Although H.K. Porter aid Roanoke Iron suggest that a desire to weaken
the union or even not aid it will be evidence of a bad faith refusal to agree
to a checkoff, that conclusion is severely undermined by Cone Mills Corp.'7
In that case, the company had refused to agree to a checkoff "on the ground
that it was not in the best interest of the Company" to do so. ' When
pressed, the company admitted that based on its prior experience, it felt that
this union would be "less trouble" (cause fewer strikes) if it did not have a
checkoff.5 9 During negotiations, the company spokesman said that "he was
not going to grant the checkoff to help the Union build a 'strong' Union."' 6
The company admitted that again during the unfair labor practice hearings,
and also advanced a number of other reasons for refusing to agree to this
term. 161
The ALJ found the refusal to be an unfair labor practice, largely because
of the employer's selective and discriminatory opposition to payroll deduc-
tions. The Board reversed, however, admitting that the employer had "vague
and specious reasons for declining the Union's proposals,"' 62 and had oth-
erwise engaged in conduct which "render[ed] suspect' '1 63 its bargaining po-
sition. Nevertheless, the Board cited numerous offsetting factors, to wit:
there was insufficient evidence of an intent to weaken or destroy the union
(apparently, the Board did not read that into the employer's desire not to
make the union "strong"); the union had existed since 1955 without a
checkoff; agreement had been reached on other items; 64 and the company
156. 390 F.2d at 857 (Burger, J., dissenting).
157. 169 N.L.R.B. 449 (1968), order enforced in part and denied in part, 413 F.2d 445 (4th
Cir. 1969).
158. Id. at 454.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 455.
161. The company argued that unions which collect their own dues are more responsive to
their members, that checkoffs create ill will among the employees and alienate them from their
union, and that this was an internal union matter. Id. The ALJ rejected most of these reasons.
He said that the union responsiveness argument "concerned a matter exclusively between the
member and his union and of no concern to [the employer]." Id. at 457. Of course, the same
could be said for the matter of dues collection. With respect to the allegation of intra-employee
ill will, the ALJ said that there was no evidence of that with respect to the other items for
which the employer honored a payroll deductions. Id.
162. 169 N.L.R.B. at 449.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 449. See also American Oil Co., 164 N.L.R.B. 36, 39 (1967) (willingness to make
concessions on other matters negated the inference that a refusal to agree to the checkoff was
intended to frustrate reaching an agreement).
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expressed some willingness to agree to alternative ways of collecting dues
(even though the ALJ had found each of these to be totally impractical).165
The Board simply ignored the discriminatory aspects of the company position
on payroll deductions.
Cone Mills Corp. cannot be reconciled with H.K. Porter and Roanoke
Iron & Bridge. All one can say is that an employer runs a risk when it
refuses to agree to a checkoff and states that its position is based on the
prospect of adversely affecting the union's strength and effectiveness as a
collective bargaining representative. The risk is that its position may be cited
as evidence of bad faith, but only if the Board further concludes that the
employer took the position for the purpose of avoiding or frustrating the
bargaining process altogether.' 66 Given the unpredictability of that conclu-
sion, employers would be well advised not to adopt this bargaining position.
4. Employee Free Choice
In opposing union security agreements generally, employers often attempt
to justify their position by reference to a concern for preserving the "free
choice" of the individual employees. In Atlas Metal Parts v. NLRB, 167 the
employer suggested a "freedom cf choice" proposal in lieu of both the
union security and checkoff provision that had been included in prior
contracts. The Board adopted what amounted to a "once in, always in"
approach. It also characterized the company's substitute proposal as being
"unreasoned, redundant, and inflammatory" and as "predictably unaccept-
able" to the union. 16 The court of appeals disagreed, however, rejecting the
notion that once an employer agrees to union security and a checkoff, it is
bound to continue to agree to it in subsequent contracts. The court implicitly
accepted as legitimate the employer's reason for wanting to eliminate these
contract terms, namely "so that employees would have a free choice con-
cerning Union membership.' ' 69 That explanation makes sense with respect
to the union security issue, but because the Taft-Hartley Act itself guarantees
employee free choice with respect to the checkoff, it is not clear why this
concern justifies an employer's refusal to agree to such a provision.
165. 169 N.L.R.B. at 449.
166. Something more than mere adamant opposition to a checkoff is required in order to
justify a conclusion that the employer was motivated by a desire to frustrate agreement. See
Stevenson Brick & Block Co., 160 N.L.R.B. 198, 209-10 (1966) (conclusory assertion that the
employer was so motivated), enforcement denied, 393 F.2d 234 (4th Cir. 1968).
167. 252 N.L.R.B. 205 (1980), enforcement denied, 660 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1981).
168. Id. at 220-21.
169. 660 F.2d 304, 308 n.3 (7th Cir. 1981). "Free choice" was also asserted as a justification
in McLane Co., 166 N.L.R.B. 1036, 1038 (1967). It was not explicitly rejected as a legitimate
justification, and the employer was found to have bargained in bad faith for other reasons.
Id. at 1042.
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5. Proof of Discrimination
The final reason that employers have advanced for refusing to agree to a
checkoff is a somewhat unusual one. In Markle Manufacturing Co.,' 7° the
company had a checkoff agreement with the union. During the term of this
contract, however, the company had also been subjected to a large number
of unfair labor practice charges and contract grievances alleging discrimi-
nation against union members. Essential to such a claim is proof that the
employer knew or had reason to know of the adversely affected employee's
union membership.' 7' Apparently, the union had established this knowledge
by reference to the fact that the employer was checking off the dues of
union members. To eliminate such knowledge, and thus free itself from these
claims of discrimination, the company proposed to eliminate the checkoff
arrangement.172
The AU found this to be an "eminently reasonable position,' ' 73 given
the union's litigious propensities. The Board, however, said that it was
tantamount to a withdrawal of an existing term or condition of employment
because the employees had exercised their section 7 rights. This retaliation,
coupled with the fact that the employer "implicitly" conditioned continuation
of the checkoff on a waiver of these rights, led the Board to find that the
employer had bargained in bad faith. 74
Subsequently, in American Thread Co.,'" another employer asserted ex-
actly the same reason for opposing any further checkoff arrangements. The
AU found this to be an unfair labor practice, but the Board disagreed and
expressly overruled Markle. In a rare instance of reexamining the factual
findings of a prior case, the Board concluded that there was no evidentiary
basis for concluding that the employer in Markle had "implicitly" offered
to continue the checkoff if the union would agree not to file discrimination
claims. 76 Presumably, if an employer did in fact make such an offer, it
would still be an unfair labor practice. The Board did not specifically refer
to the retaliation thesis of Markle, although it presumably rejected it as a
matter of law. In any event, it quoted favorably the Markle AL's obser-
vation that the company's bargaining position was "eminently reasonable." 77
In sum, one can only say that bargaining over the checkoff is fraught
with perils for the employer who desires not to agree to such a provision.
The danger, however, may be more apparent than real. Assuming that the
employer's state of mind is not what the Board and the courts think it ought
170. 239 N.L.R.B. 1353 (1979).
171. See Leyendecker Paving, Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. 28, 38-39 (1980) (insufficient proof of
layoff in retaliation for union activity).
172. Markle Mfg., 239 N.L.R.B. at 1364.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1355.
175. 274 N.L.R.B. 1112 (1985).
176. Id. at 1113.
177. American Thread, 274 N.L.R.B. at 1113 (citing Markle, 239 N.L.R.B. at 1364).
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to be, a meaningful remedy for such bad motives is virtually nonexistent.
6. Difficulties with Remedies
In H.K. Porter Co., the court of appeals upheld the Board's finding that
the company had bargained in bad faith, but was ambivalent about the
remedy.1 78 In the bargaining that followed the decision, the parties again
came to impasse over the checkoff issue. The company's response to the
union's renewed demand for a checkoff was to suggest the possibility of
making a table in the payroll office available to the union for dues collection
purposes. The union, however, took the position that the court decree
required the company to actually include a checkoff provision in the contract.
In a decision clarifying its original decree,'79 the court of appeals began
by recognizing an inherent conflict between two statutory policies. On the
one hand, it noted that the Act is grounded on the premise of freedom of
contract, the terms of which are determined by the parties rather than the
Board. 180 On the other hand, however, the court noted that the Act also
guarantees a "meaningful" right of collective bargaining, which was intended
to be enforced through the Board's broad remedial powers.' 8' After balancing
these two policies, the court concluded that ordering a recalcitrant employer
to grant a checkoff was, in certain instances, the only way to guarantee the
right of collective bargaining. 82 At the same time, it concluded that such a
requirement was at most a minor intrusion on freedom of contract, because
178. H.K. Porter Co., 153 N.L.R.B. 1370 (1965), enforced sub nom. United Steelworkers v.
NLRB (Porter I), 363 F.2d 272 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 851 (1966), later
proceedings, United Steelworkers v. NLRB (H.K. Porter I1), 389 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1967),
on remand, 172 N.L.R.B. 966 (1968), enforced, 414 F.2d 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1969), reversed, 397
U.S. 99 (1970). See supra note 141 and accompanying text. The ALJ originally indicated that
the employer would be required to resume negotiations and bargain in good faith on the
checkoff issue-presumably, by advancing some reason for refusing to accept it other than a
desire not to aid the union-but that the employer would not be required to agree to a checkoff
arrangement. 153 N.L.R.B. at 1373 n.9. The court of appeals expressly rejected that approach.
"To suggest that in further bargaining the company may refuse a check-off for some other
reason, not heretofore advanced, makes a mockery of the collective bargaining required by the
statute." 363 F.2d at 276 n.16. The court, however, also indicated that it was not necessary
for the Board's order to specifically require the company to withdraw its objections to either
the checkoff or the union's alternative of collecting dues in non-working time in non-working
areas-which would be tantamount to requiring it to agree to such terms. Rather, the court
felt that enforcement of the Board order, which merely required the employer to cease and
desist from refusing to bargain with the union, should be enforced through contempt proceed-
ings. Id.
179. United Steelworkers v. NLRB (H.K. Porter II), 389 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1967). The
union had moved for a clarification of the court's decree earlier, but it had been denied. The
union then asked the NLRB to initiate contempt proceedings against the company, but this too
was refused. The union then again asked the court for a clarification of the decree, and this
time the court acceded to the request. Id. at 298.
180. Id. at 300.
181. Id. at 300-01.
182. Id. at 301.
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it is of such little consequence to the employer. 183 The court thus remanded
the case back to the NLRB, which entered an order requiring the company
to agree to a checkoff.1 4
The United States Supreme Court reversed. 85 The Court held that section
8(d) not only prohibits the Board from relying on a refusal to agree as the
sole evidence of bad faith bargaining, it also limits the Board's power to
impose a substantive term as a remedy to bad faith bargaining that has been
established on other bases.8 6
As a consequence of H.K. Porter, an employer may apparently refuse to
agree to a checkoff provision for what the Board regards as an illegitimate
reason, and thus be guilty of an unfair labor practice, but still avoid having
this provision imposed on it by way of remedy. The courts have yet to
address the question of whether such an employer could be found guilty of
contempt, but H.K. Porter would presumably preclude that remedy as well.
In sum, the checkoff cases have revealed a fatal flaw in the law of collective
bargaining-the existence of a "wrong" without any meaningful "remedy."
While "state of mind" violations of the section 8(a)(5) duty to bargain
over checkoffs are both difficult to establish and impossible to remedy, the
same is not true with respect to so-called "per se" violations. During the
term of a collective bargaining agreement, employer abrogation of the check-
off provision will constitute a breach of the contract. It will also be a per
se violation of the section 8(a)(5) duty to bargain collectively as defined in
section 8(d) to include the duty to continue "in full force and effect ... all
the terms and conditions of the existing contract."'' 7 Even if the collective
183. Id. at 302.
184. 172 N.L.R.B. 966 (1968), enforced, 414 F.2d 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1969), reversed, 397 U.S.
99 (1970).
185. H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970). See generally Note, Labor Law-NLRB
May Not Order Employer to Include Checkoff Provision in Collective Bargaining Agreement
as Remedy for His Refusal to Bargain, 23 VAND. L. REv. 874 (1970) (discussing H.K. Porter
holding that order to bargain in good faith within remedial authority of Board, but it cannot
compel either party to agree to any particular substantive provision in the collective bargaining
agreement).
186. 397 U.S. at 107-08.
187. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982). See International Distrib. Centers, Inc., 281 N.L.R.B. 742,
743 (1986) (fact that employer was in a "precarious financial condition" was no excuse for
failure to remit dues as required by the contract). However, in the absence of a contract
provision obligating an employer to honor checkoff authorizations, the unilateral discontinuance
of a long-established practice of doing so may or may not be a violation of section 8(a)(5). In
Creutz Plating Corp., 172 N.L.R.B. 1 (1968), the contract contained a union security clause
but no checkoff provision. The employer had honored checkoff authorizations for many years,
but suddenly discontinued the practice without bargaining. The Board held that "[while such
change was proper and not violative of the Act insofar as it affected employees who had not
signed authorizations for such deductions, it was violative of Respondent's duty to bargain
with respect to the employees who had signed authorizations." Id. at 11. However, the Board
also emphasized that the timing and other circumstances indicated that the employer's purpose
was to undermine the union and stated that it was thus unnecessary to decide if the employer
could have done it otherwise. Id. at 11 n.26.
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bargaining agreement is itself silent on the question of revocation, the Board
has held that the agreement incorporates by reference the terms of the
checkoff authorization, including those relating to irrevocability, 88 thus
making the employer potentially guilty of an unfair labor practice if it honors
untimely revocations.' s9
C. The Question of Voluntariness
Voluntariness is the sine qua non of any valid checkoff arrangement. ,90 It
is thus an unfair labor practice for an employer to checkoff dues without
prior employee assent.' 9' Moreover, it is an unfair labor practice for either
the employer or the union to "coerce" an employee into signing a checkoff
authorization. However, the line between illegal coercion, on the one hand,
and lawful encouragement by the union or mere cooperation by the employer,
on the other, is a question of fact and judgment. If the collective bargaining
agreement contains a union security clause and a checkoff provision, an
employer may advise employees of their duty to pay money under the union
security clause and of the availability of the checkoff as a means of satisfying
that duty.' 92 But the employer cannot expressly or implicitly indicate that
signing a checkoff is obligatory.'9 Conversely, an employer may respond to
188. Shen-Mar Food Prod., Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 1329, 1330 (1976).
189. The question of whether there is a section 8(a)(5) duty to continue the checkoff in effect
following the termination of the collective bargaining agreement will be dealt with in Part D,
infra.
190. See, e.g., Armco, Inc. v. NLRB, 832 F.2d 357, 364 (6th Cir. 1987) (dues checkoff
provision must be voluntary choice of employees); NLRB v. Atlanta Printing Specialties and
Paper Products Union, 523 F.2d 783, 787 (5th Cir. 1975) ("Congress intended to preserve the
employees' freedom of choice to refrain from union membership." (citing Felter v. Southern
Pac. Co., 359 U.S. 326 (1959))).
191. E.g., Guard Services, Inc., 134 N.L.R.B. 1753, 1759 (1961) (Board found unfair labor
practice where collective bargaining agreement required employer to checkoff union dues without
any authorization from employees).
192. See, e.g., Keller Plastics Eastern, Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 583, 587 (1966) (although employer
solicited employees to sign union authorization and checkoff cards and warned them that they
could be discharged pursuant to union security clause unless they did so, Board ruled that
employer had merely advised employees of their contractual obligation and means for satisfying
it). Cf. NLRB v. Sellers, 346 F.2d 625, 629 (9th Cir. 1965) (clerk handed checkoff authorization
forms to new employees as they were hired, but no one in higher management knew about this
and employees were not told that they were required to sign); Plant & Field Serv. Corp., 184
N.L.R.B. 849 (1970) (checkoff authorization forms which employer distributed as a part of the
hiring process, and letter employer sent employees, stated forms were voluntary).
193. See, e.g., NLRB v. Revere Metal Art Co., 280 F.2d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 1960) (employees
summoned to foreman's office and told they had to sign checkoff authorization forms; called
"coercion in the most literal sense" by the court), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 894 (1960); Mode
O'Day Co., 280 N.L.R.B. 263, 253, 255 (1986) (illegal to include a checkoff authorization
form, already filled in and dated, among the other employment forms an employee was required
to sign); Tribuiani's Detective Agency, Inc., 233 N.L.R.B. 1121, 1124 (1977) (illegal for
supervisor to ask employees to sign checkoff authorization form); Hope Indus., Inc., 198
N.L.R.B. 853, 857 (1972) (illegal to threaten loss of job unless employee signed checkoff
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employee requests for information about' when and how their checkoff
authorizations may be rescinded, provided there are no accompanying threats
or promises.' 9
4
A union's actions may also be coercive and give rise to unfair labor
practice charges. It cannot threaten employees with economic loss unless
they sign a checkoff form, 95 make signing a checkoff authorization a
condition to referral from a union hiring hall, 196 or make the checkoff the
only way in which the union security obligation can be satisfied.1 97
Another form of "involuntariness" arises when an employee has willingly
signed a checkoff authorization, but the employer withholds and forwards
to the union monies not covered by the terms of the authorization. Here,
the issue is one of individual assent, thus the terms of the authorization
rather than the terms of the collective bargaining agreement control. In one
case, for example, the collective bargaining agreement authorized the check-
off of union "assessments, if any," but the checkoff authorization itself
referred only to the union's "initiation fee and monthly dues."'' 98 The Board
held that while a "one-time assessment" might fall within the scope of what
the contract authorized, it was not within the terms of the checkoff author-
ization. Thus, the union and the employer illegally coerced the employees
when this assessment was simply added to the amount that was being checked
off.199
authorization); Northern Metal Prod. Co., 171 N.L.R.B. 98, 109 (1968) (employees told they
could not revoke their checkoff authorizations unless they quit); Paranite Wire & Cable Div.,
Essex Wire Corp., 164 N.L.R.B. 319, 323 (1967) (illegal to give employees the "impression"
that they must sign a checkoff authorization).
194. See Peoples Gas Sys., Inc., 275 N.L.R.B. 505 (1985); University of Richmond, 274
N.L.R.B. 1204 (1985).
195. See, e.g., International Union of Elec. Workers, Local 601, 180 N.L.R.B. 1062 (1970)
(employer threatened employees with discharge or loss of employment if they refused to sign
checkoff authorization); Hunter Outdoor Prod., Inc., 176 N.L.R.B. 449 (1969) (Board ordered
union and employer to jointly and severally reimburse employees, who had not given uncoerced
authorization, for dues checked off for union which was not representative of an uncoerced
majority of employees).
196. E.g., Bellkey Maint. Co., 270 N.L.R.B. 1049, 1051 (1984) (if individuals wanted to be
referred to employer, they had to complete checkoff form which also served as referral slip to
be presented at job site).
197. Local 4012, CWA (Michigan Bell Tel. Co.), 184 N.L.R.B. 166, 175 (1970) (union
adopted a resolution requiring all dues to be collected by payroll deduction and employee was
informed that he must sign authorization); see also Columbia Transit Corp., 246 N.L.R.B.
483, 489 (1979) (neither the union nor the employer threatened or effectuated the discharge of
any employees for their failure to execute checkoff authorizations).
198. AMCAR Div., ACF Indus., 245 N.L.R.B. 339, 340 (1979), enforced as modified sub
nom. Brotherhood of Ry. Carmen, Lodge 365 v. NLRB, 624 F.2d 819 (8th Cir. 1980).
199. Id. at 341. See also NLRB v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 307 F.2d 3, 20 (3d Cir. 1962)
(reimbursement ordered where employer had deducted a "strike assessment" from wages of
employees who had merely authorized the checkoff of "membership dues," but no reimburse-
ment to those employees whose authorizations referred to "monthly dues ... and assessments");
see supra notes 37 and 46 and accompanying text. See also Electric Auto-Lite Co., 92 N.L.R.B.
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D. The Status of Checkoff Arrangements During Contract Hiatus
Periods
After a collective bargaining agreement has expired, questions arise with
respect to: (1) whether an employer can discontinue the checkoff of union
dues; and, (2) whether an employer must discontinue the checkoff if an
employee requests it. The section 8 unfair labor practice aspects of the
contract-hiatus issue are somewhat different, and even more complicated,
than the section 302 aspects discussed earlier in Part II-B. These two issues
are discussed separately in this section.
1. The Employer's Duty to Continue Checkoff
The employer's purported obligation to continue the checkoff derives from
section 8(a)(5) of the Act. Generally speaking, if something is a mandatory
subject of bargaining, an employer has a section 8(a)(5) duty to maintain
the status quo with respect to that matter until it has bargained to impasse
with the union over any changes. 200 Thus, if the contract has established a
certain wage rate, the employer must continue to pay that rate, even though
the contract has expired, until it has bargained with the union over either a
reduction or an increase. Not all contract terms involving mandatory subjects
of bargaining, however, survive in that fashion. The checkoff is among the
exceptions o.20
In Bethlehem Steel Co., 2 0 2 the Board held that the employer did not violate
section 8(a)(5) when, after the contract expired, it ceased to require employees
1073, 1077 (1950) (fine for not attending union meetings could not be added to the authorized
amount). See generally Note, Labor Law-Strike Assessments Not Periodic Dues-N.L.R.B.
v. Food Fair Stores, 4 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 434, 434 (1963) (discussing Food Fair Stores
and the Third Circuit's holding that assessments, even when uniformly applied to all union
members, are not "periodic dues" within the meaning of sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2)); Note,
Labor Law-Enforceable Union Security, 12 OHio ST. L.J. 297, 300 (1951) (discussing the
Board's increasing acceptance of the checkoff as an enforceable union security device).
200. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982). See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962) (employer's
unilateral changes of merit pay increase and automatic wage increase systems, and sick-leave
policy, prior to impasse in bargaining violated section 8(a)(5)); NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg
Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349-50 (1958) (employer's insistence that "ballot" and "recog-
nition" clauses be included in collective bargaining agreement violated section 8(a)(5) because
clauses were only permissive, not mandatory, subjects). For further discussion of the relation
between impasse and the duty to bargain, see R. GORMAN, supra note 4, at 445-50 (1976);
Turner, Impasse in the 'Real World' of Labor Relations: Where Does the Board Stand?, 10
EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 468 (1984). See supra notes 100 & 103 for a discussion of mandatory
subjects of bargaining.
201. See generally Bosanac, Expiration of the Collective Bargaining Agreement: Survivability
of Terms and Conditions of Employment, 4 LAB. LAW. 715, 723-26 (1988). A successor
employer, thus, is also not obligated to continue to honor the checkoff obligations of the
predecessor employer. S-H Food Serv., Inc., 199 N.L.R.B. 95, 95 n.2 (1972) ("Checkoff, being
solely a contractual obligation, did not carry over as an existing term or condition of employ-
ment.").
202. 136 N.L.R.B. 1500 (1962), enforced sub nom. Industrial Union of Marine Workers v.
NLRB, 320 F.2d 615 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 984 (1964).
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to join the union and also discontinued the checkoff. With respect to
requiring union membership as a condition of employment, the Board held
that the statute itself allows such a requirement only if it is pursuant to a
contract term satisfying the conditions of section 8(a)(3). 03 When the contract
expires, the employer's right and duty to impose this requirement ceases.
Although the Act does not similarly limit checkoff agreements, the Board
treated the checkoff as merely being the way in which the union security
provision was implemented, and thus subject to the same limits with respect
to the duration of the employer's duty.2 4 With respect to that duty, the
Board seemed to suggest that it terminates as a matter of law with the
expiration of the contract.2°5 The Board also seemed to suggest, however,
that the survivability of a checkoff provision turns on how the provision is
worded, by stating that "[t]he very language of the contracts links Respon-
dent's checkoff obligation to the Union with the duration of the contracts." 206
The Board's reasoning and conclusion were affirmed by the Third Cir-
cuit. 20 7 Neither the Board's nor the court's decision made clear, however,
whether the nonsurvivability of the checkoff was merely a matter of inter-
preting the particular language of that contiact, or whether the employer's
section 8(a)(5) duty terminated as a matter of law when the contract expired,
regardless of what the checkoff provision said. For a time, the Board
recognized that Bethlehem Steel left open the question of whether a checkoff
provision which was not expressly tied to the term of the agreement would
nevertheless automatically expire with the agreement, but found it unneces-
sary to resolve the question by deciding later cases on other grounds. 28 The
203. Id. at 1502.
204. Id.
205. Id. See also Tonkin Corp., 165 N.L.R.B. 607, 614 (1967) ("It is axiomatic that under
section 8(a)(3) of the Act a union shop and dues checkoff cannot be maintained without
contractual support therefor."), enforced, 420 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1969).
206. Bethlehem Steel Co., 136 N.L.R.B. at 1502 (contract stated "the Company will, begin-
ning the month in which this Agreement is signed and so long as this Agreement shall remain
in effect, deduct from the pay of such Employee each month . . . his periodic Union dues for
that month.").
207. Industrial Union of Marine Workers, 320 F.2d 615 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 984 (1964). The court of appeals stated its conclusion in these terms:
The right to require union membership as a condition of employment is dependent
upon a contract which meets the standards prescribed in § 8(a)(3). The checkoff is
merely a means of implementing union security. Since there was no contract in
existence when the company discontinued these practices, its action was in con-
formity with the law. . . . Moreover, the checkoff clause of the 1956 contract
expressly provided that it should remain in effect only so long as the agreement
was extant.
Id. at 619 (citations omitted).
208. American Oil Co., 164 N.L.R.B. 36, 38 (1967) (circumstances of employer's discontin-
uance of checkoff neither directly showed bad faith nor supported inference of bad faith);
Standard Oil Co. of Calif., Western Operations, Inc., 144 N.L.R.B. 520, 521 (1963) (because
checkoff clause was not tied to term of the contract the Board did not decide question whether
the employer was obligated to deduct dues).
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more recent cases, however, simply ignore the question as a possible limi-
tation on the scope of Bethlehem Steel. As the Board put it in Hassett
Maintenance Corp.,2°9 "it is well established that a union's right to the
checkoff of dues is extinguished at the expiration of the collective-bargaining
agreement creating that right.' '210
The question is, why is that so?21 Certainly, the issue should not turn on
the fortuitous presence or absence of language specifically linking the du-
ration of the checkoff to the duration of the contract as a whole. The
language to that effect in the Bethlehem Steel checkoff provision was pure
surplusage. As a matter of contract law, that provision presumably would
have expired with the rest of the contract on its expiration date anyway.2 12
In any event, the section 8(a)(5) duty to bargain is not predicated on the
existence of a binding contract.
A better explanation for the rule lies in the other prong of the Bethlehem
Steel analysis. Although checkoff arrangements are not expressly subject to
the requirements of section 8(a)(3), the policy of linking compulsory unionism
with the existence of a collective bargaining agreement is as applicable to
checkoff arrangements as it is to other forms of union security. During the
term of a collective bargaining agreement, there is a need for stability in the
employee-union and union-employer relationships. But once that contract
expires, the statutory policy is to allow the parties the maximum amount of
freedom in changing those relationships. 2 3 This policy should be read into
209. 260 N.L.R.B. 1211 (1982). See also Tampa Sheet Metal Co., 288 N.L.R.B. No. 43, 129
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1188 (Mar. 31, 1988) (duty to checkoff extinguished when contract terminated);
Robbins Door & Sash Co., Inc., 260 N.L.R.B. 659, 659 (1982) (employer ceased deducting
dues from payroll when previous contract expired); Ortiz Funeral Home Corp., 250 N.L.R.B.
730, 731 n.6 (1980) (dues checkoff can be extinguished on expiration of contract); Peerless
Roofing Co., 247 N.L.R.B. 500, 505 (1980) (after expiration of contract, employer stopped
paying over any dues to union).
210. Hassett Maintenance Corp., 260 N.L.R.B. at 1211. But see Trans World Airlines, Inc.
v. Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 809 F.2d 483, 491-92 (8th Cir. 1987) (checkoff
provision continues under the RLA despite NLRA authority to the contrary).
211. In Hudson Chem. Co., 258 N.L.R.B. 152 (1981), the administrative law judge explained
the rule by reference to the wording of section 302(c)(4), which makes a checkoff authorization
irrevocable only for a year or until the termination of the collective bargaining agreement,
whichever occurs first. The ALJ concluded that "[b]ecause the agreement expired, so did the
checkoff authorization." Id. at 157. This is certainly consistent with how the Fourth Circuit
read section 302 in Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 822, 58
F.2d 41 (4th Cir. 1978). See supra note 60 and accompanying text (discussion of why a better
explanation would be one that draws its essence from the law of unfair labor practices under
section 8 rather than section 302).
212. In Nolde Bros. v. Local 358, Bakery Workers Union, 430 U.S. 243 (1977), the Supreme
Court held that if an arbitration provision does not expressly state that it terminates with the
remainder of the contract, then it survives the expiration of the contract. That decision, however,
merely reflects the unique position that arbitration plays in federal labor law and is inapplicable
to other contract terms, such as the checkoff. See supra notes 69-70 for a discussion of
arbitration, and Part IV infra.
213. This policy is evident, not only in the automatic termination of the union membership
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section 8(a)(5) as an exception to the general duty to maintain the status
quo on mandatory subjects until bargaining has been exhausted.
The rule, however, can also be justified directly by reference to section
8(a)(5) theory. The explanation for why wage provisions survive (in the form
of a section 8(a)(5) duty to maintain the status quo) while checkoff provisions
do not, lies in the tenuous status of the checkoff as a mandatory subject of
bargaining in the first place. The Board has explained that only "those terms
and conditions established by the contract and governing the employer-
employee, as opposed to the employer-union, relationship survive the con-
tract. ' 21 4 This is a logical extension of the test for identifying mandatory
subjects of bargaining. 215 Core matters, directly effecting the employer-
employee relationship, such as wages, are subject to a rigorous bargaining
duty. In contrast, peripheral matters, dealing primarily with the employer-
union relationship, such as the checkoff, are subject to a lesser duty of
bargaining-not including the duty to maintain the contractual status quo
while actual bargaining is being conducted. Whatever the explanation, it is
relatively clear that an employer does not commit a section 8(a)(5) violation
by refusing to continue to honor checkoff authorizations during a hiatus
between collective bargaining agreements.
2. The Employer's Duty to Honor Revocations
The second issue which arises following the expiration of a collective
bargaining agreement is whether the employer violates section 8(a)(l) if it
refuses to honor employee revocations that are submitted during this period.
Here, the general rule is that the expiration of the collective bargaining
agreement has no effect on the continued validity of the checkoff authori-
zation itself, vis-a-vis the employer's privilege of refusing to honor attempted
revocations. 1 6 The employee's right of revocation, rather, must be deter-
mined from the terms of the authorization itself. If the authorization is by
its express terms revocable at will, then the refusal to honor a revocation
will be an unfair labor practice. 2 7 Furthermore, if the authorization is of
indefinite duration, it will likewise be regarded a revocable at will. 218 But if,
requirement, but also in the "contract bar doctrine," which requires other unions, employees,
or the employer to wait until the expiration of the contract before filing a petition for an
election that might lead to a change in bargaining representatives. For further discussion see
C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 361 (2d ed. 1983); R. GORMAN, supra note 4, at 54-
59.
214. Gordon L. Rayner, 251 N.L.R.B. 89, 90 (1980).
215. See Chemical & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 17, 158 (1971).
216. See Sun Harbor Caribe, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 444, 446 (1978) (deductions were pursuant
to authorizations).
217. See Merchants Fast Motor Lines, 171 N.L.R.B. 1444, 1445 (1968) (deduction after valid
revocations violated section 8(a)(l) and 8(a)(2)).
218. See Trico Prod. Corp., 238 N.L.R.B. 1306, 1309 (1978) ("authorizations which do not
provide for any limitation on revocability are revocable at will").
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as is usually the case, the authorization purports to limit the signor's power
of revocation, then the Board will usually honor those limits.
For example, in the leading case on this issue, Frito-Lay, Inc., 21 9 the Board
saw that the checkoff authorization allowed for revocation only during two
periods (including a ten-day window period prior to the expiration of the
contract). It concluded from this term that the authorizations "expressly
contemplated ' 20 the continuation of the checkoff even when no contract
was in force. It further concluded that the union and the employer did not
commit unfair labor practices by continuing to honor the authorizations of
employees who had attempted to revoke them.
The law on this issue reflects the Board's unhealthy preoccupation with
the checkoff as a form of "contract," with unfair labor practices being
resolved by narrow reference to the terms of the authorization, rather than
statutory policy. This approach is mistaken. When an employer refuses to
honor a checkoff revocation, the unfair labor practice issue is whether the
employer has violated the employee's section 7 right to refrain from union-
related activities. More specifically, the issue is whether the employee has
waived that section 7 right by signing a checkoff form which states that the
authorization is irrevocable except during certain designated periods. When
the issue is stated in those terms, the answer becomes fairly obvious.
Individual waivers of statutory rights are not favored in federal labor
law. 22' Indeed, where it would defeat the underlying purposes of the Act,
an individual waiver may be given no effect at all as a defense to employer
and union unfair labor practice charges.2 22 For example, in Pattern Makers'
League v. NLRB, 223 the Supreme Court held that an employee has a section
7 right to resign from the union even though the employee, by becoming a
member, implicitly promised not to resign during a strike or lockout. This
was because the Court found "union restrictions on the right to resign to
219. 243 N.L.R.B. 137 (1979).
220. Id. at 139 (emphasis in original). See also American Nurses' Ass'n, 250 N.L.R.B. 1324,
1331 (1980) (parties did not intend to allow revocations during contract hiatus).
221. Cf. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 254 N.L.R.B. 826, 831 (1981). Here, the Board
narrowly construed an alleged waiver of an employee's "Weingarten rights," first recognized
in NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975), to have a union representative present
at any interview required by the employer which the employee reasonably believes could result
in disciplinary action. The alleged waivers were ineffective because the employer had threatened
the employees with dire consequences if they insisted on their rights to a representative. 254
N.L.R.B. at 831. Similarly, in Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 1223 (1977), the
employees had not knowingly and voluntarily waived their Weingarten rights. In response to
their request for a representative, the employer told employees that higher management would
have to be called in with worse consequences for the employees. Id. at 1223 (Board will
"carefully scrutinize any claim that employees have waived their guaranteed [Weingarten]
right").
222. Cf. J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 336 (1944). In J.L Case, the Court established
the principle that each individual employment contract is subsidiary to, and may not waive any
benefit of, the collective bargaining agreement between the employer and the union. Id.
223. 473 U.S. 95 (1985).
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be inconsistent with the policy of voluntary unionism implicit in § 8(a)(3). 2 24
Similarly, the fact that a checkoff authorization purports to limit the right
of revocation to two specific times is irrelevant to the question of whether
an additional right nevertheless exists under section 8. Rather, the very same
policy of voluntary unionism compels the conclusion that at the termination
of a contract, employees should have the opportunity to reevaluate their
support for the union, free from any "contractual" constraints to the
contrary. Thus, regardless of whether it is the direct imposition of union
"membership" as a condition of employment following the expiration of
the contract, or a checkoff authorization that the employee cannot revoke
during this period (which amounts to the same thing), these devices should
be considered illegal.
This is particularly true when the two devices were initially used in tandem,
with the union security provision imposing the duty to become a union
"member" and the checkoff authorization being used by the employee merely
as a convenient way of discharging that duty. The section 8(a)(3) proviso
requires that the union security provision duty, to be a union "member,"
terminate with the expiration of the contract; it would totally defeat the
purpose of the proviso to then allow the checkoff to serve as an additional
source of a duty to remain a "member" of the union during this period.225
Finally, it should be recalled that the Board has used the section 8(a)(3)
policy of freedom of choice to limit the section 8(a)(5) duty to not change
terms and conditions of employment until bargaining is exhausted.2 26 It would
coalesce this body of law into a coherent whole for the Board to use that
same policy to define the employer's section 8(a)(1) duty not to coerce
employees.
E. The Effect of an Employee's Resignation From the Union on the
Power to Revoke a Checkoff Authorization
Despite the fact that it is partially wrong, the law with respect to the
effect of a contract hiatus on checkoff authorizations has been relatively
stable. That is not the case with respect to the question of the legal effect
of a resignation from membership upon the continued irrevocability of a
checkoff authorization. Although the Board has consistently regarded this
as primarily a matter of "contract" (e.g., the checkoff authorization) inter-
pretation, it has taken conflicting positions on how an authorization should
be construed.
224. Id. at 104.
225. See Lowell Corrugated Container Corp., 177 N.L.R.B. 169, 173 (1969) (continuing to
honor a checkoff authorization after the contract has expired is an unfair labor practice, but
only with respect to employees who have attempted to revoke); cf. NLRB v. Penn Cork &
Closures, Inc., 376 F.2d 52, 55-56 (2d Cir.) (holding that a checkoff authorization becomes
revocable once the union's authority to negotiate union security provision has been rescinded),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 843 (1967).
226. See supra notes 202-07 (discussing Bethlehem Steel).
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Initially, the Board held that an employee's resignation as a member of
the union had no effect on a checkoff authorization that was otherwise
revocable only at certain times. In Shen-Mar Food Products, Inc.,227 the
collective bargaining agreement obligated the employer "to checkoff from
the pay of its employees, who are members of the Union, the regular monthly
dues and initiation fees. '"228 The agreement also provided that the union
would furnish the proper authorizations to the employer, and the authori-
zations in question were irrevocable for the periods allowed by section
302(c)(4).
The Board held that the collective bargaining agreement incorporated the
terms of the checkoff authorizations, including their irrevocability except at
certain times, and that the agreement's reference to employees "who are
members of the union" was "language of convenience rather than limita-
tion. 22 9 The Board thus found that the employer violated the section 8(a)(5)
duty to bargain, as defined in section 8(d) to include the duty to abide by
the terms of the contract, when it honored the revocations of employees
who had resigned from the union. 230
Subsequently, in San Diego County District Council of Carpenters (Camp-
bell Industries), 2 1 which was the companion case to Frito-Lay, Inc.,232 the
Board held that a resignation from the union could operate to terminate a
checkoff authorization. The Board cited the terms of the authorization,
which stated that it was given "in consideration of the benefits received and
to be received by me as a result of my membership in the Union. ' 233 Because
of this authorization language, the Board ruled "that an effective resignation
from the Local Union also revoked the checkoff authorization by operation
of law." ' 234 The Board distinguished Frito-Lay, which had involved resigna-
tions as well as a contract hiatus, on the grounds that the authorizations
there were not expressly based on union membership.
Member Murphy's dissent argued that the "consideration" language was
without legal significance because most, if not all, checkoffs are implicitly
granted in return for the benefits of union membership anyway. 23 "Con-
227. 221 N.L.R.B. 1329 (1976), enforced, 557 F.2d 396 (4th Cir. 1977).
228. Id. at 1329 (emphasis added).
229. Id. at 1330.
230. Id. The Board also apparently affirmed the ALJ's finding that the employer had violated
section 8(a)(1) by honoring the revocations, in that its action "interfere[d] in the relationship
of employees and their representative and constituteld] an unlawful infringement upon the
Section 7 rights of employees." Id. at 1329. This is an ironic conclusion given the fact that
section 7 expressly gives employees the right to refrain from union activity.
231. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters (Campbell Indus.), 243 N.L.R.B. 147
(1979).
232. 243 N.L.R.B. 137 (1979). See supra notes 219-20 and accompanying text for a discussion
of Frito Lay in connection with the effect of the expiration of the contract upon the employee's
right to revoke.
233. Campbell Indus., 243 N.L.R.B. at 149.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 150 (Murphy, Member, dissenting).
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sequently, if the majority's reasoning here is accurate, it would necessarily
follow that in every instance resignation from a union necessarily revokes
any outstanding dues checkoff. 23 6 Subsequent cases have confirmed the
logic of that observation.
Indeed, in the cases following Campbell Industries, the Board expanded
the theory of the case to include any authorization that even mentioned
"membership dues," whether the term "consideration" was used or not.
For example, in Local Lodge 2095, IAM (Eagle Signal),23 7 which has become
the "name case" for the Board's quid pro quo theory, the authorization
merely referred to the employee's "initiation or reinstatement fees and ...
regular monthly Union dues ... in accordance with regular membership
dues" in the union. 28 In some of the cases where the Board has found
resignation to effectuate revocation as a matter of law, the fact that the
employees could not have intended to be merely "financial core" members
reinforced the theory that the checkoff was a quid pro quo for membership.
Either the collective bargaining agreement did not contemplate that form of
membership 2 9 or such a requirement would have violated a state right-to-
work law. 240 The contrary intention was present, however, in American
Nurses' Association.2 41 As later construed by the Board, "[tihe contractual
provisions in that case provided for payment of an amount equivalent to
236. Id. (emphasis in original).
237. 268 N.L.R.B. 635 (1984).
238. Id. at 636. See also Amalgamated Transit Union, Local Div. No. 1225, 129 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1077 (Sept. 24, 1987) (language in authorization, "as my membership dues in said
Union," constituted quid pro quo for union membership and employees effectively revoked
dues checkoff when they resigned from union); Local No. 128, Int'l Union of UAW (Hobart
Corp.), 283 N.L.R.B. 1175, 1177 (1987) (because language "as union dues" and "from me as
membership dues" makes payment of dues quid pro quo for union membership, valid resignation
operates to revoke dues checkoff authorization).
239. In United Steelworkers, Local No. 7450 (Asarco Inc.), 246 N.L.R.B. 878 (1979), the
contract had a maintenance-of-membership provision which the Board implicitly, but errone-
ously, construed as requiring actual rather than mere "financial core" membership. Id. at 882.
In any event, the Board concluded from the provision that the employee's checkoff authorization
was for actual membership dues, and that when such membership ended so did the authorization.
Id. This reasoning is completely nonsensical, of course, because the most that any union security
agreement can require of an employee is "financial core" membership. See Communications
Workers v. Beck, 108 S. Ct. 2641 (1988).
240. Indeed, the Board has correctly noted that in the absence of an employee right to resign
from the union and simultaneously revoke the checkoff authorization, in a right-to-work state
a union could accomplish indirectly through a checkoff arrangement what state law prohibits
it from accomplishing directly through a union security device. United Food Workers, Local
425 (Hudson Foods, Inc.), 282 N.L.R.B. 1413, 1414 n.5 (1987); Shopmen's Local 539 (Zurn
Indus.), 278 N.L.R.B. 149, 152 (1986). For a discussion of the relation between the checkoff
and state right to work laws, see infra Part V of this Article, and T. HAGGARD, supra note 4,
at 153-57.
241. 250 N.L.R.B. 1324 (1980). The Board affirmed the ALJ's order dismissing the complaint
that the employer had refused to honor valid revocation of checkoff authorizations. The
revocations were ineffective because they were not submitted during the ten day period specified
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fees and dues either to the union as a member, to the union as a nonmember,
or to a nonreligious, tax-exempt charitable institution. ' 24 2 Since what was
being checked off was not clearly related to union membership as such, a
resignation from membership was found to have no effect on the irrevoca-
bility of the checkoff.
243
Yet, the courts of appeals have not been receptive to the Board's quid
pro quo theory. For example, in NLRB v. Shen-Mar Food Products,244 the
Fourth Circuit agreed with the Board's original position on the issue, which
had dismissed as irrelevant the inclusion of "membership" language in the
authorization. More directly on point are a series of cases involving the
United States Postal Service and the special checkoff provisions applicable
to that employer. In United States Postal Service (Dalton),24 1 the Board
relied on the Eagle Signal line of cases and held that since the checkoff
authorization specifically referred to "membership dues," an employee's
resignation from the union also constituted a revocation of the checkoff, by
operation of law.
Although under the Postal Reorganization Act 246 the Postal Service is
subject, in part, to the provisions of the NLRA, there are still some important
statutory differences. The Postal Reorganization Act, for example, has its
own provision regulating the checkoff, and it is worded somewhat differently.
While section 302(c)(4) speaks in terms of a wage "assignment which shall
not be irrevocable for a period of more than one year, '247 section 1205
refers to an "assignment, which shall be irrevocable for a period of not
more than one year.' '248 In Dalton, however, the Board found that the two
provisions were essentially the same, and that there was nothing in the
legislative history suggesting that "the [Postal Reorganization Act] mandates
irrevocability for 1 year notwithstanding the nature of the obligation actually
in the authorization. Id. at 1330-31. Revocations were submitted by other employees during
the hiatus between collective bargaining agreements. The ALJ ruled that the parties had not
intended to provide for an escape period during a hiatus. Id. at 1331 (citing Frito-Lay, Inc.,
243 N.L.R.B. 137 (1979)). A final group of employees submitted "opt-out" forms to the
employer and union which were also ineffective because the employees could not unilaterally
change the terms of their authorizations and of the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 1332
(citing Cameron Iron Works, Inc., 235 N.L.R.B. 287 (1978)).
242. The Hearst Corp., 281 N.L.R.B. 764, 766 n.15 (1986) (emphasis in original) (citing
American Nurses Ass'n, 250 N.L.R.B. 1324 (1980)), aff'd without opinion, 837 F.2d 1088 (5th
Cir. 1988). The dues deducted here consisted only of the membership dues of the guild and
were a quid pro quo for union membership. Resignation therefore had the effect of revoking
authorization. Id. at 766.
243. American Nurses Ass'n, 250 N.L.R.B. at 1331 & n.26.
244. 557 F.2d 396, 399 (4th Cir. 1977).
245. 279 N.L.R.B. 40 (1986), enforcement denied, 827 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1987).
246. Pub. L. No. 91-375, 84 Stat. 719 (1970) (codified as amended 39 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1209
(1982)).
247. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(4) (1982).
248. 39 U.S.C. § 1205(b) (1982).
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incurred in the authorization itself." 249 Apart from that, the only other novel
aspect of the Board's decision in this case was the suggestion of Member
Johansen that the authorization was still valid, but that the amount to be
deducted and forwarded was zero, because the employee was no longer
obligated to pay dues.
250
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that the statute itself does not
affirmatively require that the checkoff be irrevocable for a year. 25' On the
other hand, the court disagreed with the Board's conclusion that the checkoff
authorizations in Dalton allowed for revocation upon resignation from the
union. 2 2 What was lacking, the court said, was any cogent explanation by
the Board about how it reached that conclusion. The court noted that the
Board merely relied on its earlier cases, especially Campbell Industries, the
reasoning of which the court then proceeded to reject. 253
The court was apparently willing to assume that the "in consideration of"
language of the authorization in Campbell Industries created a constructive
condition of exchange. That is, the employee's duty to continue the author-
ization was conditioned on the employer's return performance or tender of
performance-which the court said consisted of " 'the benefits received and
to be received' as a result of union membership. ' 25 4 The court observed that
the employer had not failed tu provide these benefits; rather, the employee
had unilaterally declined to accept them. Thus, the court concluded that the
employee's choice (resignation) did not excuse the employee's duty of per-
formance.255 Although the case arose under the checkoff provisions of the
Postal Reorganization Act, the court was in essence rejecting the Board's
broader theory about the contractual relationship between union membership
and a checkoff authorization.
249. 279 N.L.R.B. at 42 n.4.
250. Id. at 42 n.5. Board Member Johansen's point was simply stated by the Board in a
footnote and not in a separate opinion.
251. 827 F.2d 548, 552 (9th Cir. 1987).
252. Id. at 554-55.
253. Id. at 554 ("rule developed in Campbell is based on a mistaken view of contract
principles").
254. Id. 827 F.2d at 554 (citing San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters (Campbell
Indus.), 243 N.L.R.B. 147 (1979)).
255. Id. at 554. As a matter of contract law, the Board would have been on firmer grounds
if it had conceptualized loss of union membership as an implied-in-fact express condition
subsequent of the employee's implied promise (duty) not to revoke the authorization for a year.
The consideration for this promise likewise would be conceptualized in terms of the employer's
implied promise to continue the checkoff for a year. Although the condition terminating the
duty would be partially within the control of the promisor, this would not make the promise
illusory. See E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 538 (1982) (a condition in a contract may be largely
within the control of the obligor, the obligee, a third person, or the condition may be beyond
anyone's control). This conceptualization would have avoided the court's correct observation
that a promisor cannot renege on a promise by simply refusing to accept the consideration
being given in return for the promise. Of course, all of this is putting contract law to a use
for which it was not intended.
[Vol. 39:567
UNION CHECKOFF ARRANGEMENTS
Because it was the Board itself that originally opened the Pandora's Box
of contract analysis, one can hardly suppress a smirk when the court so
rudely but correctly slammed the lid back down on the Board's fingers. In
any event, having reviewed the rationale advanced by the Board and having
found it to be wanting, the court declined to speculate about whether the
same result might be reached under a different theory.25 6 Indeed, the court
specifically negated the suggestion that the Board was necessarily bound by
common law contract principles in dealing with checkoff revocability issues. 217
The court thus left it open for the Board to devise an approach to the
problem which is based upon federal labor policy rather than a specious and
erroneous application of contract law.
The Board, however, declined the invitation. In United States Postal
Service (Huber),21s the Board adhered to its original position. The ALJ had
dismissed the Eagle Signal line of cases as a mere "recent trend" which was
inconsistent with congressional intent and ordinary contract principles which
would have required the authorization to expressly provide for revocation
upon resignation. 2 9 The Board reversed the ALJ, relying solely on its prior
decision in Dalton.2 6°
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals denied enforcement of the Board's
order on three grounds. First, the court ruled that the Board's equation of
the Postal Reorganization Act's checkoff language with that of the NLRA
256. 827 F.2d at 555. The court noted, but declined to review, Member Johansen's theory
that the checkoff remained unrevoked but that the amount due was zero. Id. See supra note
250 and accompanying text regarding Johansen's position.
257. Id. at 554. Judge Fletcher concurred with the result, but on the theory that the specific
wording of section 1205 requires that checkoff authorizations in the Postal Service be irrevocable,
while the wording of section 302(c)(4) is merely permissive with respect to irrevocability. Id. at
555-56 (Fletcher, J., concurring).
258. 280 N.L.R.B. 1439 (1986), enforcement denied, 833 F.2d 1195 (6th Cir. 1987).
259. Id. at 1445 (ALJ stated "absent an expression on the face of the checkoff authorization
that dues deductions are to cease on termination of membership, the stated limitations on
revocation prevail.") The ALJ concluded that because Congress expressly guaranteed the right
to revoke under certain specific conditions, not including resignation of union membership, the
implication is that the right of revocation does not exist in the latter situation. Id. at 1445 n.12.
With respect to the quid pro quo or consideration analysis, the ALJ concluded that the use of
those terms did not necessarily make the obligations mutually dependent-at least not in the
sense of the employee having the power to resign from membership and thereby escape the
obligation to continue the dues checkoff. The ALJ compared the resignation to a lease where
rent is the quid pro quo for possession, but where a tenant cannot escape from the obligation
of paying rent by unilaterally abandoning possession. Id. at 1446 n.13. The ALJ's contract
analysis is superior to that of the Board's, but equally irrelevant to the proper resolution of
the issue, which would address the problem from the perspective of federal labor policy rather
than based upon an analogy to leasehold principles in landlord-tenant law.
260. 280 N.L.R.B. at 1439. See also National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 283 N.L.R.B. 644
(1987) (union violated section 8(b)(1)(A) by refusing to honor members' resignations and
revocations of checkoff authorizations, which had been executed in consideration of union
membership).
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was wrong as a matter of statutory interpretation.2 6 Second, the court
concluded that the two checkoff provisions should not be construed in pari
materia because of the significant differences between labor relations in the
Postal Service and the private sector. 26' Third, although the court's reasoning
on these two points implicitly suggests that the Board's theory might be
correct when applied in the purely private sector context, the court ultimately
rejected the overall approach. The court stated that it agreed with the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Dalton, holding that the Board had misapplied basic
contract law principles by assuming that a resignation from membership
automatically relieves the employee of the duty to continue the checkoff. 263
The court, however, conceptualized the consideration (i.e. "the benefits of
union membership") as flowing from the union, rather than from the
employer 264 (which was how the Ninth Circuit had oddly conceptualized it).
Moreover, since the union remained ready to tender the benefits of mem-
bership, the employees could not unilaterally abrogate their promise to tender
dues through a checkoff arrangement.
The General Counsel had argued that the Board's decision was supported
by Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB,265 which held that a union cannot
enforce a contractual limit on a member's right to resign. The court rejected
the argument, stating that Pattern Makers' was predicated on a policy of
"voluntary unionism" which was not at issue in Huber because the employees
were free to leave the union without punishment. 266 While that is true with
respect to the resigning employee's avoidance of the disciplinary power of
the union, the Pattern Makers' policy of voluntary unionism encompasses
far more than that. Indeed, in both the Postal Service context and in right-
261. Huber, 833 F.2d at 1199. The court stated:
The language of the two laws is similar, but crucially different. Section 302(c)(4)
of the NLRA provides that an authorization "shall not be irrevocable for a period
of more than one year." . . . The provision allows, but does not require, an
authorization to be irrevocable, and it places a maximum on the length of permissible
irrevocability. The PRA, in contrast, provides that the Postal Service will deduct
dues from the pay of employees who have made "a written assignment which shall
be irrevocable for a period of not more than one year." . . . On its face, section
1205 requires that any assignment made must be irrevocable for a period up to a
year.
Id. (emphasis added by court) (footnote omitted).
262. Id. In particular, the court noted that "(tihe prohibition of union security clauses in
the Postal Service makes the irrevocability provision of section 1205 the only way the union
can accurately predict its future income and the level of services it can provide." Id. This
statement, however, tacitly recognizes that an irrevocable checkoff is the functional equivalent
of the more traditional forms of union security. Contrary to the reasoning of the court, it
would seem highly unlikely that Congress would prohibit something in one section and require
it in another.
263. Id. at 1200.
264. Id. at 1200 & n.10.
265. 473 U.S. 95 (1985).
266. Huber, 833 F.2d at 1201.
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to-work states, voluntary unionism connotes freedom from any compulsory
support of the union, including mere "financial core" membership. 267 It
would thus be contrary to the spirit of Pattern Makers' for that important
statutory policy to be defeated by the mere fact that the employee has signed
a checkoff authorization which purports to be irrevocable except at certain
times.
The Huber court also noted, however, that even if the Pattern Makers'
argument had merit, the Board had not relied on it in reaching its decision
and the court was disinclined to affirm the Board's action on the basis of
reasons not relied upon by the Board itself.26 Thus, this procedural point
suggests that despite the court's generally negative reaction to the Pattern
Makers' argument, the court might, nevertheless, be receptive to a Board
decision that was based on considerations of federal labor policy rather than
a misapplication of the common law of contracts. Certainly, to the extent
that a checkoff authorization serves to perpetuate one of the incidents of
formal union membership beyond the date an employee has exercised the
statutory right to resign from that membership, the irrevocable checkoff is
contrary to federal labor policy.
The Board may soon have the opportunity to adopt a Pattern Maker's
approach to the revocation question. In a case involving the Smithfield
Packing Company, the Board's Division of Advise recommended that the
Regional Director issue a complaint when the employer continued to deduct
union dues from certain employees who had resigned from the union and
attempted to revoke their checkoff authorization. 269 Since this occurred in a
right-to-work state, the employees had no financial obligations to the union-
other than that imposed by the checkoff authorization itself.270 The Board's
Division of Advise, however, was of the opinion that the employees' promise
to not revoke the checkoff authorization for a year was subordinate to their
section 7 rights under Pattern Makers':
In our view, the Section 7 rights of employees to resign necessarily encom-
passes the right to sever all ties to the union, at least in the absence of a
union-security clause. The Section 7 right would be hollow indeed if the
employee could be required to continue to lend financial support to the
union from which he/she just resigned. In other words, a requirement that
267. 39 U.S.C. § 1209 (1982) (disallowing any form of compulsory union support). Section
1209(c) provides that: "[elach employee of the Postal Service shall have the right, freely and
without fear of penalty or reprisal, to form, join, and assist a labor organization or to refrain
from any such activity, and each employee shall be protected in the exercise of this right." Id.
State right-to-work laws similarly prohibit employers and unions from imposing any membership
or financial obligations on employees as a condition of employment. See T. HAGGARD, supra
note 4, at 172-78.
268. Huber, 833 F.2d at 1201.
269. NLRB Adv. Mem. (Smithfield Packing Co.) (Nos. 5-CA-20106 & 5-CB-6180) (Mar. 6,
1989).
270. The irrevocable checkoff is a form of "compulsory unionism" that is beyond the power
of the states to prohibit thru right-to-work laws. See infra text at Part IV.
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the resignee continue to pay membership dues is inconsistent with the
principle that an employee can resign membership at any time.' 7'
Although the Board has not yet had the opportunity to consider the
Smithfield Packing theory, if Regional Directors continue to issue complaints
on the basis of this Advice Memorandum, the issue will get to the Board
and the courts eventually. Since the theory is based on sound considerations
of federal labor policy and Supreme Court decisions, it is likely to be
accepted.
F. Other Factors Effecting the Revocability of a Checkoff Authorization
1. Union Security Deauthorizations Elections
Under section 9(e)(l), 272 employees who are subject to a union security
agreement may petition the Board for an election to determine whether the
union's power to negotiate such a provision should be revoked. The Second
Circuit dealt with the effect of a successful deauthorization election on the
continued validity of checkoff authorizations in NLRB v. Penn Cork &
Closures, Inc.2 73 The collective bargaining agreement initially contained both
a union security provision and a checkoff provision. Many employees signed
checkoff authorizations, which were subject to limited revocability. Subse-
quently, in a Board election, the employees rescinded the union security
provision. Many of them also resigned from the union and attempted to
revoke their checkoff authorizations. The company refused to honor the
request on the grounds that it remained bound by the contract. The Board
found the employer guilty of unfair labor practices, and the court agreed. 274
The court's decision was based on two lines of analysis, one concerned with
the presumed intent of the employees and the other with the policy of the
statute.
271. NLRB Adv. Mem. supra note 269, at 2. The Division of Advice, alternatively, also
adopted Member Johansen's position that once an employee exercises the right to resign from
the union, that employee's dues obligation is zero, and that this is the amount that can be
checked-off. Id. at 4-5.
272. 29 U.S.C. § 159(e)(1) (1982). The Taft-Hartley Act originally prohibited a union from
negotiating any kind of union security agreement unless the employees specially authorized it
in a Board-conducted election. 61 Stat. 136, 141, 144-45 (1947). See Whitney, Union-Shop and
Strike-Vote Elections: A Legislative Fallacy, 2 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 247 (1949). In 1951,
Congress eliminated that requirement, but nevertheless made all union security agreements
subject to a deauthorization election if 3007o of the employees requested one. 65 Stat. 601-602
(1951). See generally Dworkin & Extejt, The Union-Shop Deauthorization Poll: A New Look
After 20 Years, 102 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 36 (1979); Morgan, The Union Shop Deauthorization
Poll, 12 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 79 (1958). Current studies suggest that a union security
deauthorization election is often a precursor to the decertification of the union as the collective
bargaining representative. See Bain, Scott & Arnold, Deauthorization Elections: An Early
Warning Signal to Decertification?, 39 LAB. L.J. 432 (1988).
273. 376 F.2d 52 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 843 (1967).
274. Penn Cork, 156 N.L.R.B. 411 (1956).
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With respect to the intent analysis, the court agreed with the Board that
when a union security provision exists, it is logical to infer that employees
who authorize a checkoff do so for the purpose of complying with the
provision's requirement concerning the payment of dues.275 The union se-
curity provision is, in other words, an implied condition of the employee's
duty to continue the checkoff. Thus, when the union security provision is
rescinded, the absence of "the procuring cause of checkoff authorizations
' 276
allows the employees to also revoke the authorization pursuant to the failure
of the condition.
Additionally, the Board and the court also indicated that continued irrev-
ocability of a checkoff authorization would conflict with the policy of free
choice underlying section 9(e)(1). Deauthorization of the union security
provision would most likely be motivated by the employees' desire to be free
of the obligation to pay union dues, and if it did not achieve this end,
rescission of the provision would not give employees a real choice. 277 The
policy argument is a compelling one, and should be applied whenever the
statute allows an employee to be free from the requirements of compulsory
union "membership," such as during contract hiatus periods.
27
1
2. Requirements Later Imposed by the Collective Bargaining Agreement
The revocability of checkoff authorizations may also be effected by re-
quirements imposed by collective bargaining agreements adopted after the
authorizations have been executed. In Cameron Iron Works, Inc., 279 the
checkoff authorization required the employee to give notice of revocation
to the employer. The collective bargaining agreement was later revised to
also require written notice to the union. The employer, at the union's
insistence, refused to honor a revocation, the notice of which had not been
sent to the union, and the Board ruled that both the employer and the union
had committed unfair labor practices.
2 0
275. Penn Cork, 376 F.2d at 56.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 55 (continued irrevocability "would undermine the freedom of election that
Congress intended under § 9(e)(l), since rescission of the union security clause would be of
little benefit if it did not provide relief from continued payment of union dues, very likely the
principal reason workers would seek rescission"). See also Bedford Can Mfg. Corp., 162
N.L.R.B. 1428 (1967) (employer violated section 8(a)(l) by continuing to deduct union dues
and initiation fees after employees attempted to revoke checkoff authorizations following vote
to deauthorize the checkoff).
278. In Lowell Corrugated Container Corp., 177 N.L.R.B. 169, 173-74 (1969), aff'd, 431
F.2d 1196 (lst Cir. 1970), the ALJ read Penn Cork as applying equally to both authorization
rescissions and contract expirations. Although that is certainly consistent with the theory of the
case, there is no express language in the decision to that effect. The problems of contract hiatus
are discussed in the context of section 302(c)(4), supra Part II-B, and of section 8, supra Part
III-D.
279. 235 N.L.R.B. 287 (1978), enforcement denied, 591 F.2d I (5th Cir. 1979).
280. Id. at 289.
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The Board found that the authorization was a contract between the
employee and the employer, and that the Act required this contract to be in
writing. Revocation requirements imposed by a later collective bargaining
agreement deprive employees of the protection which the statutory require-
ment of a "written assignment" was designed to provide. 2 1 The Board also
suggested that the imposition of new revocation requirements would under-
mine the one-year limit on irrevocability, since noncompliance would force
the employee into another year of checkoff. 212 The Board, in other words,
gave the terms of the checkoff authorization precedence over the terms of
the collective bargaining agreement .283
The Fifth Circuit refused to enforce the Board's order. 214 Without deciding
whether the employer and union violated section 302, the court held that in
any event there were no unfair labor practices. The court adopted the position
of the ALJ that "an employer who has acted reasonably and in good faith
in construing the dues checkoff authorization card and the collective bar-
gaining agreement's provisions regarding revocation has not infringed upon
an employee's exercise of Section 7 rights. '2 5 More specifically, the court
held that adherence to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement
neither coerced nor discriminated against the employees. 2 6 In any event, the
281. Section 302(c)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(4). The Board stated:
Thus, if an employer and union are free to change the revocation procedure without
the assent of the individual employee affected thereby, the terms of the written
agreement by which the employee authorized dues deductions become meaningless,
and the employee loses the protection intended by the requirement in Section
302(c)(4) of a 'written assignment.'
235 N.L.R.B. at 289.
282. Id.
283. Conversely, in Furr's, Inc., 264 N.L.R.B. 554 (1982), the Board ignored the limitations
on revocation that were contained in the checkoff authorization because the collective bargaining
agreement, which provided for the checkoff arrangement but which was silent on revocation,
also expressly stated that any individual term of employment that "conflicts" with the collective
agreement was void. Id. at 555. Arbitrators had thus held that the limitations contained in the
checkoff authorization were not binding and that the employer did not violate the collective
bargaining agreement by honoring certain checkoff revocations. In a section 8(a)(5) unfair labor
practice proceeding, the Board deferred to the arbitration decisions under the Spielberg doctrine.
Id. at 557. See infra Part IV for a discussion of the NLRB's policy of deferring to arbitration.
284. 591 F.2d I (5th Cir. 1979).
285. Id. at 3. The court cited three Board cases in support of this proposition-none of
which truly support it. In American Smelting & Ref. Co., 200 N.L.R.B. 1004 (1972), the Board
expressly declined to rely exclusively on the employer's reasonableness and good faith in
construing the checkoff and contract. Rather, the Board held that the employer's action based
on that construction was not an unfair labor practice. In Miller Brewing Co., 193 N.L.R.B.
528 (1971), and Morton Salt Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 1402 (1958), the Board was confronted with
checkoff and contract provisions which it said were ambiguous; the Board stated that it did
not want to get involved in a matter which was primarily a matter of contract interpretation.
There was no ambiguity, however, involved in Cameron Iron.
286. Cameron Iron, 591 F.2d at 4. The conclusion with respect to coercion simply begs the
question, since it assumes that individual assent to the terms of the collective bargaining
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court essentially gave the terms of the collective bargaining agreement priority
over the terms of the checkoff authorization.
The collective bargaining agreement, however, cannot impose procedural
requirements which make revocation unduly burdensome. In Felter v. Southern
Pacific Co.,2s7 the Supreme Court held that under the Railway Labor Act a
union cannot insist that revocation be only on a form furnished by the
union. In Peninsula Shipbuilders' Association v. NLRB, 2ss which arose under
the Taft-Hartley Act, the collective bargaining agreement similarly required
employees to use a special revocation form. The union apparently argued
that Felter did not apply, due to differences in the wording of the two
statutes. The court, however, found it unnecessary to decide whether the
provision was invalid on its face under the Felter rationale. Rather, the court
merely held that the provision as enforced clearly inhibited the employees'
statutory right to revoke their checkoff authorizations. 219
3. Termination of Employment
In Industrial Towel and Uniform Service, 290 the Board held as a matter
of law that the severing of the employment relationship also severs an
employee's obligations under a checkoff authorization. Thus, if that em-
ployee is later rehired, the employer cannot resume checking off dues unless
the employee signs a new authorization form. The test that the Board used
in determining the "severance" issue was whether the employee had an
intention of returning and a reasonable expectancy of reemployment at the
agreement is not required. The court's finding of no discrimination is likewise faulty, since it
was expressly based on the notion that section 8(a)(3) is violated only when various employees
are treated differently-which is not what encouragement of union membership "by discrimi-
nation" means under the statute. For example, in Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S.
793 (1945), the Court held that an employer violated section 8(a)(3) for disciplining an employee
who had violated a no-solicitation rule, even though the employer had argued that there was
no "discrimination" because the rule was applied to all cases, not just those involving union
solicitation.
287. 359 U.S. 326 (1959).
288. 663 F.2d 488 (4th Cir. 1981).
289. The Board had found that there was no easy access to the forms that the contract
required employees to use, that employees had to go personally to the union hall, and that
employees who wanted to revoke may have also been required to resign from the union. Id. at
493. For a more detailed report of the Board's findings, see Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry
Dock Co., 253 N.L.R.B. 721 (1980).
290. 195 N.L.R.B. 1121 (1972), enforcement denied, 473 F.2d 1258 (6th Cir. 1973) (per
curiam). In this case, the employee had left the company's employment due to illness. Some
three years later, she was reinstated in a position commensurate with her reduced physical
abilities, but she did not complete a new employment application. Id. at 1121. The ALJ found
that she was not rehired as a new employee and because she had not revoked her checkoff
authorization, it had been automatically renewed. The Board disagreed with the ALJ's assess-
ment of the facts, but the court of appeals held that the Board's position was not supported
by substantial evidence. 473 F.2d 1258, 1261.
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time.29' In a later case, 292 the Board also held that an employee's motivation
in quitting is irrelevant, even if that motivation is primarily to avoid the
obligation imposed by the checkoff.293
G. Monetary Remedies
The usual remedy for an unfair labor practice, including those involving
illegal checkoff arrangements, is a cease and desist order. 294 In addition, the
Board can impose monetary sanctions. 291 If the employer has breached an
agreement to checkoff union dues, the Board will normally require the
employer to reimburse the union for the dues it would have received by this
method but for the breach. Thus, the employer is liable only for the dues
of employees who have signed authorization forms.296 Even with respect to
these employees, the union may have a duty to mitigate its loss by attempting
to collect the dues by other means.2 97 If the remedy also includes a backpay
award to the employees, the employer may deduct the dues from those
payments. 29 Although there is no clear precedent on the point, it appears
that the employer may also recoup the payment by deducting it later from
the employees' paychecks, 299 assuming of course that they are still employed.
291. 195 N.L.R.B. at 1121. The Board has also applied this test to situations where an
employee is transferred out of the bargaining unit into a supervisory position, and then back
into the bargaining unit. See Cameron Iron Works, Inc., 272 N.L.R.B. 984 (1984).
292. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks (Yellow Cab Co.), 205 N.L.R.B. 890 (1973), enforced,
498 F.2d 1105 (5th Cir. 1974).
293. Id. at 891. In this case, one employee went to work for a rival cab company during a
strike. Although under the strike settlement agreement he was eligible to be rehired without
loss of seniority if he applied in ten days, he waited until later to apply, apparently believing
that this would relieve him of his checkoff obligations. Id. at 890. The Board found that
regardless of the employee's motives in waiting, a severance in the employment relationship
had occurred. Id. at 891. The Board similarly held that an employee who had been discharged
for cause, but later rehired, was also relieved of his obligations under the checkoff authorization
he had previously signed. Id. at 892.
294. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982).
295. See generally J. HUNSICKER, J. KANE & P. WALTHER, NLRB REMEDIES FOR UNFAIR
LABOR PRACTICES 109-12 (rev. ed. 1986) (discussing various reimbursement remedies for illegally
exacted union dues, fees and fines).
296. See, e.g., Southland Dodge, Inc., 205 N.L.R.B. 276 n.1 (1973), enforced without
opinion, 492 F.2d 1238 (4th Cir. 1974) (employer not liable for reimbursement of union for
loss of dues resulting from employer's failure to sign collective bargaining agreement reached
by the parties where employees had not signed checkoff authorizations).
297. See Amoco Prod. Co., 233 N.L.R.B. 158 (1977) (where collection by alternative means
would be difficult, union's failure to try did not constitute a waiver of the right to reim~burse-
ment).
298. See Ogle Protection Serv., Inc., 183 N.L.R.B. 682 (1970), enforced, 444 F.2d 502 (6th
Cir. 1971).
299. In NLRB v. Shen-Mar Food Prod., Inc., 557 F.2d 396, 399 n.1 (4th Cir. 1977), the
court observed that "[tihe [Board's] order does not address itself to the primary responsibility
of the individual employees for such dues as between them and their employer." Id.
[Vol. 39:567
1990] UNION CHECKOFF ARRANGEMENTS
On the other hand, with respect to employees who have been coerced into
signing or continuing a checkoff authorization despite attempts to revoke, 3°°
the Board normally imposes joint and several liability on the employer and
the union.30 1 However, an employer will be only secondarily liable if it can
show that it strongly resisted the union's unlawful practice or otherwise
acted in good faith.302 Finally, reimbursement will be denied altogether if
the employees would have been required to pay the money to the union
anyway, under a valid union security agreement.303
IV. NLRB DEFERENCE To ARBITRATION
Though the Act regulates them, checkoff arrangements are also subject
to the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement between the union
and the employer. Most collective bargaining agreements provide for the
resolution of contract disputes through a process of arbitration. Thus, an
employer who refuses to checkoff dues when obligated to do so will be
potentially subject to both arbitration and unfair labor practice proceed-
ings. 3°4 Where both types of proceedings are available, the Board has devel-
oped a policy of deferring to arbitration in certain circumstances to avoid
multiple litigation. Those circumstances are spelled out in the Collyer doc-
300. On the authority of Local 60, United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. NLRB, 365 U.S.
651 (1961), the Board will not order reimbursement to an employee unless it can be shown that
the particular employee was actually coerced by the illegal conduct. See, e.g., True Temper
Corp., 217 N.L.R.B. 1120, 1124-25 (1975) (reimbursement for employees for dues illegally
exacted by checkoff authorization required for individual to be considered for employment);
Raymond Buick, Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 504, 504 (1970) (reimbursement only for employees who
had been coerced); Stainless Steel Prod., Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 232, 233 (1966) (same).
301. See, e.g., Brotherhood of Ry. Carmen, Lodge 365 v. NLRB, 624 F.2d 819, 821-22 (8th
Cir. 1980) (also limiting reimbursement to employees who could be reasonably contacted);
NLRB v. Hi-Temp, Inc., 503 F.2d 583, 586-87 (7th Cir. 1974) (employer and union jointly and
severally liable for reimbursement of employees who had been coerced to contribute to minority
union); Sheraton-Kauai Corp. v. NLRB, 429 F.2d 1352, 1357-58 (9th Cir. 1970) (employer and
union liable to employees for initiation fees and dues where employees joined union after being
told that contract required union membership).
302. See NLRB v. Campbell Soup Co., 378 F.2d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1967) (joint and several
liability imposed for reimbursement of dues exacted from newly hired employees who were
required to join union immediately as condition of employment, but if employer had resisted
this practice it might have been only secondarily liable), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 900 (1967);
Hermet, Inc., 222 N.L.R.B. 29, 29 n.1 (1976) (joint and several liability imposed because
employer did not strongly resist or act in good faith); see also Kinney Nat'l Maint. Serv. v.
NLRB, 81 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2733, 2733 (9th Cir. 1972) (court imposed reimbursement liability
only on the union; "We do not believe the purposes of the act would be served by compelling
the company to, in effect, pay the dues twice"). But cf. Meijer, Inc. v. NLRB, 564 F.2d 737,
744 (6th Cir. 1977) (rejecting employer "good faith" as a defense to a reimbursement order).
303. Wickes Cos., Inc. (Mode O'Day Co. Div.), 290 N.L.R.B. No. 162, 129 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1276 (Sept. 26, 1988); American Geriatric Enters., 235 N.L.R.B. 1532 (1978); Strafford's
Restaurant, Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 474 (1970).
304. An employer who checks off dues without any employee authorization will be guilty of
an unfair labor practice, but it would be difficult to conceptualize that as a-breach of contract.
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trine,0 5 under which the Board will withhold its jurisdiction over an alleged
unfair labor practice, even if none of the parties have invoked the arbitration
process, if the contract and its meaning lie at the center of the dispute, the
employer is willing to arbitrate, and the parties have a history of amicable
relations. 06 Under present policy, the Board will defer in advance to arbi-
tration in cases involving interference with section 7 rights, discrimination,
and bad faith bargaining.30 7 Furthermore, under the Spielberg doctrine,30
the Board will defer to the award which an arbitrator has rendered if the
proceedings appear to have been fair and regular, all parties agreed to be
bound, the decision of the arbitrator is not clearly repugnant to the purposes
and policies of the Act,3°9 the contractual issue is factually parallel to the
unfair labor practice issue, and the arbitrator was presented generally with
the facts relevant to the unfair labor practice.310
The parameters and application of these doctrines are complex and con-
troversial, particularly when the Board's policy of deferring to arbitration
pertains to an alleged unfair labor practice involving a checkoff issue. The
Board has recognized that checkoff procedure disputes primarily involve
interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement.", Accordingly, the
Board has also recognized that arbitration is capable of resolving contract
interpretation issues.' 12 The Board's actual practice, however, is rather at
odds with these statements. Indeed, the unique nature of checkoff disputes
renders them singularly inappropriate for resolution through arbitration in
most cases.
The question of deferral could come up in several ways. In the typical
checkoff controversy, the employee submits a revocation, the employer
honors it, and the union objects on the grounds that it was not timely. The
employer is then faced with the decision of either honoring the revocation
or acquiescing in the union's demand that the checkoff be reinstated.
If the employer reinstates the checkoff, the employee could file charges
alleging an employer violation of sections 8(a)(l), 8(a)(2), and 8(a)(3), and
305. The doctrine takes its name from Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971),
where it was first articulated.
306. Id. at 842. For a discussion of the Collyer doctrine, see R. GoRMAN, supra note 4, at
752-61.
307. United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557 (1984).
308. The doctrine is named for the case where the Board first stated it, Spielberg Mfg. Co.,
112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
309. Id. at 1082.
310. Id. See also Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984) (contractual issue factually parallel
to unfair labor practice charge and arbitrator was presented with facts relevant to resolving
unfair labor practice charge).
311. Furr's, Inc., 264 N.L.R.B. 554, 556 (1982) ("it is well-established Board law that
disputes about checkoff procedures essentially involve contract interpretations rather than
interpretation and application of the Act")
312. Id. at 556 ("the Board has specifically recognized that such contract issues are fully
capable of resolution through arbitration").
[Vol. 39:567
1990] UNION CHECKOFF ARRANGEMENTS 625
union violations of sections 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2).313 The employer and
union might then request that the Board defer to arbitration under the
Collyer doctrine. It is highly unlikely, however, that the Board would defer
under these circumstances. In the first place, it is doubtful that the employer's
conduct could even be conceptualized in terms of a breach of the collective
bargaining agreement. The employee's claim is founded on the absence of
a contractual duty by the employer, not the breach of one. A breach on the
union's part is even more difficult to imagine. Even if continuing to honor
an authorization that the employee has revoked could somehow be fit into
the contract breach format, under most collective bargaining agreements an
individual employee cannot compel arbitration. The union is certainly not
going to claim that the employer breached the contract by doing what the
union insisted that it do. Finally, even if the employee could demand
arbitration over the issue, it would be unconscionable for the Board to force
the individual employee to bear that expense. In sum, in this context a
Collyer deferral would constitute an indefensible abdication of the Board's
statutory duty to adjudicate unfair labor practice charges.
Deferral is more likely to become an issue when the employer takes the
alternative course and honors the revocation, in spite of the union's objec-
tions. Here, the union is faced with a decision between claiming a contract
breach and demanding arbitration, or filing charges alleging an employer
violation of sections 8(a)(5) and 8(d).314 If the union elects to file unfair
labor practice charges first, then the employer might argue for deferral under
Collyer. On the other hand, if the union takes the matter to arbitration and
the union's grievance is upheld, employer compliance with the award could
still precipitate unfair labor practice charges by the employee-as discussed
above. In regard to those charges, the employer or the union would then
argue for post-arbitration deferral under Spielberg. Or, if the arbitrator
upholds the employer's decision to honor the revocation, then the union
could still file unfair labor practice charges, with the employer then raising
the Spielberg issue.
However the issue arises, arbitration over an employer's decision to honor
a checkoff revocation suffers from two serious problems: (1) insuring that
the interests of the employees are adequately protected; and, (2) insuring
that the issues are resolved by reference to federal labor policy rather than
merely to the tenets of contract interpretation.
With respect to the first problem, the Board and the courts should not
naively assume that the employer will always vigorously defend its decision
to honor an employee's checkoff revocation. The employer's decision to
honor the revocation may have been motivated more by fear of employee
unfair labor practice charges than concern over the employee's rights. Indeed,
an employer that is locked into an established bargaining relationship with
313. See supra notes 84-89.
314. See supra notes 100-103 and accompanying text (discussion on the duty to bargain).
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a union may actually prefer that checkoff authorizations not be easily
revoked, because revocation at other than clearly delineated times simply
adds confusion and inconvenience from an administrative perspective. For
this reason alone, a Collyer deferral would always be inappropriate in
situations where the employer's discontinuance of the checkoff is a result of
employee revocations, because the Board could not predict in advance the
vigor and legal basis of the employer's defense of its position." 5
This was certainly the case in NLRB v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks
(Yellow Cab Co.), 3t 6 where at the union's insistence the employer resumed
the checkoff of several employees who had a significant break in employment.
The employees filed unfair labor charges against the union. The union
maintained that under the collective bargaining agreement the employees had
the right to resolve the issue in arbitration, and that the Board should defer
under Collyer.31 7 Even if the employees had that right in regard to grievances
against the employer, it is unclear how they could have implicated the union
as a "defendant" in an arbitration proceeding.318 In any event, the Board
315. E.g., Norfolk, Portsmouth Wholesale Beer Distribs. Assoc., 196 N.L.R.B. 1150 (1972).
In Norfolk, the employer unilaterally discontinued the checkoff following the expiration of the
contract, even though at that time no employees had requested it. The union filed charges
alleging that the employer had violated the duty to maintain the terms of the contracts under
sections 8(a)(5) and 8(d). The Board deferred under Collyer. Id. at 1151. However, there was
apparently no conflict between the employees and their union with respect to the continuation
of the checkoff. On the other hand, even if there was a community of interests between the
employees and their union on this issue, the status of a checkoff provision during a contract
hiatus would still appear to be more of a statutory than a contract issue-thus making deferral
inappropriate on that basis. This, indeed, was the position the Board took in W.P. Ihrie &
Sons, 165 N.L.R.B. 167 (1967), where the employer unilaterally discontinued the checkoff
following a successful union security deauthorization election. But because this was a pre-
Collyer decision, its value as precedent may be somewhat limited. See supra Part III-D for the
section 8 aspects of a contract hiatus.
316. 205 N.L.R.B. 890 (1973), enforced, 498 F.2d 1105 (5th Cir. 1974). See supra notes 289-
90 (discussion of the issue of severance from employment).
317. Yellow Cab Co., 205 N.L.R.B. 890, 899 n.19. Although it is possible that this particular
collective bargaining agreement did authorize an individual employee to initiate the arbitration
procedure without the approval of the union, such a provision would be highly unusual.
318. E.g., Shopmen's Local Union No. 539 (Zurn Indus., Inc.), 278 N.L.R.B. 149 (1986).
In Zurn Indus., the employees charged that the union committed unfair labor practices by
continuing to bill the employer for dues despite the employees' resignation from the union and
revocation of checkoff. With respect to the deferral argument, the ALJ noted:
In the case at hand the collective-bargaining agreement between the parties defines
a "grievance" as "any dispute between the company and the Union or any em-
ployee."t I do not, however, interpret this to include disputes between the Union
and employees. Rather, the collective-bargaining agreement makes it very clear that
grievances are intended to include disputes between the Company and the Union
on the one hand, or between the Company and an employee on the other. . . . The
collective-bargaining agreement describes no procedure for disputes between the
Union and employees. . . . No provision is made for employees to initiate arbitra-
tion, even in the case of disputes with the Employer.
Id. at 152.
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declined to defer under Collyer and the court of appeals affirmed. The court
noted that "[tihe interests of the employees and the Union are in direct
conflict in this case. The interests of Yellow Cab were not affected, and it
could not be expected to undertake the protection of the employees." 319
Deferral to an arbitration award under Spielberg presents a slightly dif-
ferent situation. If the arbitrator has upheld the employer's decision to honor
a checkoff revocation, then this would suggest that the employees' interests
were adequately protected by the employer and that, from this perspective
at least, deferral would be appropriate.320 On the other hand, if the employer
is found to have breached the contract by honoring an employee's request
to stop the checkoff and the employee then files unfair labor practice charges
against the employer, the union, or both, then the propriety of a Spielberg
deferral is more doubtful. In United Steelworkers Local No. 7450 (Asarco,
Inc.),321 the Board refused to defer to an arbitration award under those very
circumstances. The Board noted that the employee was not a party to the
arbitration and did not participate in any way. Moreover, the Board con-
cluded that neither the employer nor the union adequately represented this
employee's interests. Rather, it found that the employer and the union had
both advocated positions adverse to the employee's, because "the Union was
seeking dues, and the Employer contended that if dues were owing, [the
employee]-not the Employer-was liable to pay them. 32 2 A contrary result,
however, was reached in Associated Press,3 23 where both the Board and the
court concluded that the employee's interests were fully protected by the
employer during arbitration. 324
Even if the employer's defense in arbitration adequately protects the
employees' interest under the contract, deferral is still inappropriate due to
the role that labor law and policy should play in the resolution of checkoff
issues. When a contract issue is itself totally dispositive of an unfair labor
practice charge, then there is some justification for the Board's policy of
deferral. That is rarely, if ever, the case with respect to the unfair labor
practice charges that typically arise out of checkoff arrangements. Whether
the employer has committed a section 8(a)(5) violation, on the one hand, or
a section 8(a)(1) violation, on the other, often turns on the effect to be given
an employee's attempted revocation of a checkoff authorization. As was
discussed above, the power of an employee to revoke is determined only in
part by the language of the authorization and the collective bargaining
agreement. It is also determined, or should be, in large part by reference to
the underlying purposes and policies of the Act-a principal one being that
319. Yellow Cab, 498 F.2d at 1109.
320. See Furr's, Inc., 264 N.L.R.B. 554 (1982).
321. 246 N.L.R.B. 878 (1979).
322. Id. at 881.
323. 199 N.L.R.B. 1110 (1972), enforced, 492 F.2d 662 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
324. Id. at 1114. See also 492 F.2d at 662 n.1.
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of employee free choice. 23 Congress has given the power to deal with those
matters to the Board, not to arbitrators.3 26
Whatever the reason, the Board usually does not defer in checkoff cases.
In deciding whether to do so or not, however, the Board often performs at
least as much analysis as it would if it were deciding the issue de novo on
the merits.327 It would seem that the more efficient approach would be to
treat checkoff issues as being presumptively inappropriate for deferral and
then proceed to deal with the statutory issues directly.
V. STATE POWER To REGULATE CHECKOFF ARRANGEMENTS UNDER
SECTION 14(b)
Section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act amendments to the National Labor
Relations Act simply codified the power of the states to prohibit and
otherwise regulate all forms of compulsory unionism, despite the legality of
union security agreements under the federal statute. 28 Section 14(b) has thus
325. Many arbitrators, of course, can deal with the statutory and labor policy issues as
competently as the Board can. The deferral doctrine, however, occasionally allows some
egregious mistakes to get by. The arbitration decision in a case involving Southwestern Bell
Telephone Company is a good example of why the Board should resolve these issues itself.
There, after the contract expired, a number of employees attempted to revoke their checkoff
authorizations. See NLRB General Counsel Advice Memoranda, Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1350 (1985). The employer honored the revocations, and the union took
the matter to arbitration claiming a breach of contract. The statutory analog would have been
an alleged violation of the employer's duty to bargain pursuant to sections 8(a)(5) and 8(d).
The arbitrator upheld the grievance, on the basis of the Board's decision in Frito Lay, 243
N.L.R.B. 137 (1979). Id. at 1351. This decision, however, does not support that result. All
Frito Lay held was that an employer does not violate the section 7 rights of employees if,
during a contract hiatus, it refuses to honor the checkoff authorization of employees. The
correct precedent should have been Bethlehem Steel, 136 N.L.R.B. 1500 (1962), enforced sub
nom. Industrial Union of Marine Workers, 320 F.2d 615 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
984 (1964), where the Board held that an employer does not violate section 8(a)(5)-i.e., breach
the contract-when it honors a checkoff revocation submitted during the contract hiatus period.
By relying on the wrong precedent, the arbitrator reached a conclusion clearly inconsistent with
Board law, and the decision should have been considered repugnant to the purposes and policies
of the Act and not deferred to. Unfortunately, the Board never had the opportunity to address
the issue, because the employees' charges against the union were dismissed by the General
Counsel under Spielberg. See NLRB General Counsel Advice Memoranda, Southwestern Bell
Tele. Co., 120 L.R.R.M. 1350 (BNA) (1985).
326. Deferral to arbitration on issues involving the checkoff is, of course, only a part of the
larger issue of deferral in any situation which involves an interpretation and application of the
statute. See generally J. GETMAN & B. POGREBIN, LABOR RELATIONS: Tim BASIC PROCESSES,
LAW AND PRACTICE 208-13 (1988) (discussing role of the courts in adjusting relationship between
arbitrators and the Board).
327. The Board reaches the merits when considering the question of whether the arbitrator's
decision is "repugnant to the purposes and policies of the act." Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112
N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082 (1955). In addition, the Board also has to evaluate all the other deferral
criteria.
328. 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1982) provides as follows:
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as authorizing the execution or
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been construed as allowing the states to enact right-to-work laws which
prohibit the closed shop,3 29 the union shop,330 the agency shop, 33' and main-
tenance of membership arrangements.3 3
2
Checkoff arrangements, however, are not covered by section 14(b) and
cannot, therefore, be prohibited or regulated under state right-to-work laws.
In SeaPAK v. Industrial Employees, National Maritime Union,333 the em-
ployer was bound by contract to deduct union dues from the wages "of
those employees for whom it has valid and enforceable dues deduction
authorizations. ' 334 Although the checkoff authorization stated that it was
irrevocable for the normal one-year periods, the Georgia right-to-work law
provided that checkoff authorizations were revocable at will. When the
employer honored the checkoff revocations of several employees, the union
sought an injunction.
The federal district court granted the injunction. It construed section 302
as affirmatively permitting irrevocable authorization (for no longer than a
year), and determined that the statute totally preempted state law. Section
14(b) was found to be inapplicable, since "Congress did not conceive that
checkoff of dues for a limited time after an employee's revocation of
authorization therefor [sic] would amount to compulsory union membership
as interdicted by state 'Right-to-Work' laws.
'335
The SeaPAK decision was affirmed per curiam by the Fifth Circuit,
which merely adopted as its own the opinion of the district court.3 36 The
Fifth Circuit decision was, in turn, affirmed by the Supreme Court, but
without the benefit of oral argument and again without any additional
written opinion. 3 7  Although it is undoubtedly controlling
application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a con-
dition of employment in any State or Territory in which such execution or application
is prohibited by State or Territorial law.
Id.
329. See Sheet Metal Workers v. Nichols, 89 Ariz. 187, 360 P.2d 204 (1961). Contra Walles
v. IBEW Local 405, 252 N.W.2d 701 (Iowa 1977).
330. See 2 C. MoRRIs, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1393 (2d ed. 1983).
331. See Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 752 (1963)
("agency shops within § 14(b)").
332. Cf. Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S.
301 (1948) (state had authority to order employer to cease and desist from enforcing maintenance
of membership provision which had not been ratified according to state statutory requisites).
333. 300 F. Supp. 1197 (S.D. Ga. 1969), aff'd per curiam, 423 F.2d 1229 (5th Cir. 1970),
aff'd per curiam, 400 U.S. 985 (1971). See also International Bhd. of Operative Potters v. Tell
City Chair Co., 295 F. Supp. 961, 965 (S.D. Ind. 1968) (federal preemption based on section
302 and Board authority under section 8 (citing Penn Cork and Closures, Inc., 376 F.2d 52
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 843 (1967))).
334. 300 F. Supp at 1197.
335. 300 F. Supp. at 1200-01.
336. 423 F.2d 1229 (5th Cir. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 400 U.S. 985 (1971).
337. Justice Harlan was of the view that the case should have been given more careful
consideration. 400 U.S. at 985 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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authority,33 the SeaPAK decision is wrong. It misconstrues the scope of
section 14(b) and the meaning of the term "membership" in federal labor
law. Its practical consequence is to provide immunity to the functional
equivalent of a form of union security that section 14(b) clearly does prohibit.
Moreover, it is inconsistent with the legislative history.
One of the stated premises of the district court's argument was that in
section 302(c)(4) Congress intended to provide comprehensive and thus pre-
emptive regulation of checkoff arrangements. That premise simply will not
withstand analysis. The purpose of section 302(c) was to address the problems
of extortion and racketeering. 3 9 It did this by generally prohibiting payments
by employers to labor unions. Having thus painted the prohibition with a
broad brush, Congress then found it necessary to identify the exceptions-
one of which just happened to be checkoff arrangements. Congress' primary
intent, however, was not to regulate the checkoff, either comprehensively or
preclusively. It did no more than say that certain kinds of checkoff arrange-
ments are not illegal under the main language of the section. Thus, the
Board and the courts have consistently recognized that section 302(c)(4) does
not limit the power of the Board to further regulate the checkoff under
section 8. 34 0 It similarly follows that section 302(c)(4) should not be construed
as a limitation on the scope of authority granted to the states in section
14(b). 34 1
The second prong of the district court's argument was that the "checkoff
of dues for a limited time after an employee's revocation of authorization"
338. See, e.g., United Electrical Workers v. Westinghouse Corp., 345 F. Supp. 274, 276
(W.D. Pa. 1972) (construing SeaPAK as applying to employees who sought to revoke incident
to resignation and therefore case was "squarely controlling").
339. See Schwartz v. Associated Musicians, Local 802, 340 F.2d 228, 233-34 (2d Cir. 1964)
(purpose of section 302 to protect union welfare funds and to prevent bribery, extortion and
abuse of union office).
340. See, e.g., NLRB v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 498 F.2d 1105 (5th Cir. 1974) (legality
under section 302 not determinative of section 8 issue); Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry
Dock Co., 253 N.L.R.B. 721, 726 (1980) (federal courts have jurisdiction to enforce section
302 through criminal penalties, but section 8, enforced by the Board, also protects employees),
aff'd, 663 F.2d 488 (4th Cir. 1981). For a discussion of the doctrine which gives the Board
"primary jurisdiction" over unfair labor practice issues, see R. GORMAN, supra note 4 at 766-
86.
341. In the court's original opinion in International Bhd. of Operative Potters v. Tell City
Chair Co., 70 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2790 (S.D. Ind.), opinion withdrawn, 295 F. Supp. 961 (S.D.
Ind. 1968), the court correctly stated that "[tlhe one-year proviso . . . is merely a part of a
qualification of an exception to a general policy against employers paying money to unions.
Its existence is not a sufficient reason to pre-empt the State of Indiana from regulating union
check-offs." Id. at 2791. See also Note, State Labor Laws in the National Field, 61 HARv. L.
REV. 840, 847 (1948):
Another form of union security device permitted by the Taft-Hartley Act is the
check-off, which is declared to be legitimate if the individual employee authorizes
the deduction. Although the Act does not expressly authorize state regulation, there
seems little doubt as to the validity of state statutes prohibiting the check-off or
further regulating its use.
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does not amount to the kind of compulsory union membership that can be
prohibited under section 14(b).3 42 Section 14(b), rather, merely "leaves un-
impaired the right of any state to prohibit union or closed shops. 3 43 The
court's mistake was to assume that the reach of section 14(b) is limited to
forms of union security which purport to require formal or actual union
membership as a condition of employment. The employer's counsel correctly
argued that this limitation on section 14(b) was inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's decisions in NLRB v. General Motors Corp.3" and Retail Clerks
International Association Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn.3 45 Those cases held
that an "obligation to pay initiation fees and regular dues" to the union
was "the 'practical equivalent' of an 'agreement requiring membership in a
labor organization as a condition of employment', ' 3 46 and therefore that so-
called "agency shops" were encompassed by both the proviso to section
8(a)(3) and by section 14(b). Because a dues checkoff authorization which
is irrevocable for a fixed period is literally an obligation to pay money to
the union and is an incident of the employment relationship, it too is the
practical equivalent of what section 8(a)(3) allows and section 14(b) permits
the states to prohibit.
Indeed, as a practical matter, an irrevocable checkoff is no different than
a form of union security known as "maintenance of membership," which
merely requires an employee who already is or who becomes a member of
the union to remain a member for the remainder of the contract.147 Because
the "membership" which a maintenance-of-membership agreement can re-
quire is limited to an obligation to pay fees and dues to the union (in contrast
to true or literal membership), it is readily apparent that there is no essential
difference between an irrevocable checkoff and a maintenance-of-member-
ship agreement.148 It is thus an anomaly to construe section 14(b) as allowing
the states to prohibit one but not the other.
Finally, there is legislative history to suggest that the decision in SeaPAK
was wrong. In 1959, the Kennedy-Ervin bill proposed certain amendments
to the Taft-Hartley Act.3 49 Specifically, the Senate version of what was to
become the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act 350 modified
section 302(c)(4) to exempt from the general prohibitions of the section
342. SeaPAK, 300 F. Supp. at 1200-01 (footnotes omitted).
343. Id. at 1201.
344. 373 U.S. 734 (1963).
345. 373 U.S. 746 (1963).
346. Id. at 751 (citing General Motors, 373 U.S. at 743).
347. A maintenance of membership clause requires an employee who becomes a member to
remain one. See T. HAGGARD, supra note 4, at 4.
348. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
349. S. 505, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, at 29, 52 [hereinafter LEGIS.
HIST. LMRDA].
350. LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73
Stat. 519 (codified primarily at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1982)).
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"money deducted from the wages of employees in payment of membership
dues in or other periodic payments to a labor organization in lieu thereof."35
Senator Goldwater's statement of opposition to this amendment was based
on its tacit approval of agency shops, which were lawful under the Taft-
Hartley Act but nevertheless subject to state proscription.352
Although the Senate passed the bill in that form, Senator Goldwater
repeated his objections to the House Committee on Education and Labor. 53
The House apparently agreed with the Senator, and the amendments it
passed did not contain the "other periodic payments . .'. in lieu" of mem-
bership dues language of the Senate bill. The Conference Committee likewise
adopted the House language, and the statute was ultimately passed in that
form.""
The implications of Senator Goldwater's position are clear. Under his
interpretation of the Senate version of the bill, the checkoff exception to
the prohibitions of section 302 would have precluded the states from pro-
hibiting irrevocable checkoff authorizations. 355 By not accepting the Senate
version, so construed, Congress apparently intended to continue to allow the
states to prohibit irrevocable checkoff authorizations despite the fact that
they are permitted under section 302(c)(4).356 The Supreme Court gave in-
adequate attention to this question in SeaPAK, which demonstrably was
decided incorrectly and which is therefore ripe for reversal.
351. SEN. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (1959), reprinted in LEGIS. HIST. LMRDA,
supra note 349, at 397, 464 (emphasis in original).
352. Senator Goldwater stated:
The bill permits the checkoff of fees paid in lieu of dues to a labor union. This
tacitly recognizes that the so-called agency shop is lawful. The agency shop is a
device now being used in an attempt to circumvent the right-to-work laws in several
States, by requiring a periodic payment to the union for its services as collective
bargaining agent without requiring the employee to join the union. Its effect, in
practical terms, is exactly equivalent to what is now permitted by way of union
security under [the] Taft-Hartley [Act], but which it was the intention of Congress
to permit the States to prohibit.
105 CONG. REC. 6848 (daily ed. May 7, 1959) (statement of Sen. Goldwater), reprinted in 2
LEGIs. HIST. LMRDA, supra note 349, at 1271.
353. Hearings on H.R. 3540, H.R. 3302, H.R. 4473, H.R. 4474, Before the Joint Subcomm.
of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., (1959) (statement of
Sen. Goldwater).
354. H. REP. No, 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), reprinted in I LaIaS. HIST. LMRDA,
supra note 349, at 934.
355. Senator Goldwater was clearly operating from that premise, and that is all that is
important for the purposes of this discussion. Whether it was a correct interpretation of the
amendment is another matter. Arguably it was not, for if the section 302(c)(4) mention of
"periodic payments" in lieu of membership dues prevents the states from prohibiting these
payments, then by the same token the mention of "membership dues" alone would also prevent
the states from prohibiting these payments as a condition of employment-a position which
Senator Goldwater surely did not subscribe to.
356. See Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees, Div. 1225 v. Las Vegas-Tonopah-Reno
Stage Line, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 726, 732-35 (D. Nev. 1962).
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On the other hand, the SeaPAK issue will become more or less moot if
the Board and the courts adopt the approach recommended by the Advice
Division in Smithfield Packing.31 7 Since under that approach an employee
will be entitled as a matter of federal law to revoke a checkoff authorization
upon resignation from the union, it would be unnecessary for an employee
to attempt to rely on a state right-to-work law making checkoffs revocable
at will. The only effect, thus, that an overruling of SeaPAK would have
would be to allow that employee to pursue the state remedies rather than
file unfair labor practice charges. That alone, however, may be of sufficient
importance to warrant a reexamination of this clearly erroneous decision.
VI. CONCLUSION
Many of the issues involving checkoff arrangements could be more easily
resolved, if not eliminated altogether, if the Board and the courts began
with the proposition that the checkoff is merely another form of union
security. Thus, an employer's obligations with respect to checkoff arrange-
ments should be no broader than they are with respect to other forms of
union security, and the entire law in this area should be construed as a
coherent whole. The corollaries of this would be as follows:
First, the mandatory duty to bargain over the checkoff should be limited
by the proviso to section 8(a)(3),.which, as construed by the Supreme Court
in Communications Workers v. Beck,35 only authorizes a service fee rather
than full membership dues. Thus, a union would be able to compel bargaining
over a checkoff of that limited amount, but no more.
Second, if an employer wants to agree to deduct full membership dues
from union members who authorize it, the employer should be free to do
so. This option, however, would merely be a permissive subject of bargaining.
And neither the collective bargaining agreement nor the individual checkoff
authorizations should be construed as applying to full membership dues
unless that is clearly and unequivocally stated in both the agreement and the
authorization.
Third, if a checkoff authorization does encompass full membership dues,
then the employee's continued membership should be construed as a con-
dition of the authorization. In order to make the right of resignation
recognized in Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB meaningful, it should include
the power to also immediately revoke a checkoff authorization-either to-
tally, or at least with respect to that portion over and above what is required
of the employee under the union security agreement, if there is one.
Fourth, this approach to the checkoff would make it clear beyond cavil
that the employer's section 8(a)(5) duty to honor a checkoff authorization
and its section 8(a)(1) privilege of continuing to honor the checkoff in the
face of an attempted revocation are both dependent on the existence of a
357. See supra text accompanying notes 269-71.
358. 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
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valid contract authorizing the checkoff arrangement. This should be as a
matter of statutory law, rather than contract interpretation. That is, because
the checkoff is just another form of union security, the employees' statutory
right to be free of compulsory unionism obligations during a contract hiatus
should prevail over the employer's asserted privilege of continuing to honor
a checkoff authorization which purports to be irrevocable except at desig-
nated periods.
Fifth, since the checkoff involves a limited form of compulsory union-
ism, the states should have the power to prohibit or regulate them under
section 14(b). This, of course, would require a reversal of the Supreme
Court's ill-advised decision in SeaPAK v. Industrial Employees, National
Maritime Union.5 9
Sixth, section 302(c)(4) is a cumbersome anomaly. It is the case of an
exceptional tail wagging the statutory dog. Checkoff arrangements ought to
be regulated primarily under section 8. If an express checkoff exception is
necessary to the general section 302(c) prohibition against the payment of
money by an employer to a union, it should be worded simply in terms of
checkoff arrangements which are not otherwise illegal under section 8. This,
of course, would require congressional action.
In any event, if the Board, the Supreme Court, and Congress honestly
recognized the checkoff for what it really is-i.e., a type of union security
device-and interpreted the Act as it effects checkoff arrangements from
that policy perspective, then the law in this area might begin to make some
sense. Until then, it is destined to be a source of constant confusion.
359. 423 F.2d 1229 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam), aff'd per curiam, 400 U.S. 985 (1971).
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